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This essay empirically researches the setting of multiple tax rates by county governments 
in the presence of tax competition and agglomerations.  Previous empirical evidence 
outside the tax arena suggests that firms earn rents in the presence of agglomerations 
from external economies of scale.  As a result, governments might be able to extract a 
portion of these rents from businesses through higher tax rates.  This paper empirically 
examines how local governments set sales and property tax rates, the two largest taxes 
paid by businesses at the state and local level, taking into account tax competition 
pressures and agglomerations.  Using county jurisdictions, results are mixed regarding 
whether county governments set tax rates strategically, depending upon the specification 
of competitors.  When found to set rates strategically, county governments behave as 
strategic complements.  More specifically, a county government responds to an increase 
of one percentage point in its competitors’ sales (property) tax rate by increasing its rate 
by roughly 1.0 (0.5) percentage points.  In addition, property tax rates are positively 
associated with certain measures of agglomerations, suggesting that governments might 
attempt to capture a portion of agglomeration rents through imposing higher property tax 
rates on businesses.  These results suggest that agglomeration forces might affect the 




This essay empirically investigates how a state that easily maintains and attracts residents 
conducts its tax policy while simultaneously accounting for the impact that state tax rates 
have on migration patterns.  A state that easily maintains and attracts residents is thought 
to have some monopoly power that would allow the state to not be as concerned about the 
race to the bottom in tax rates.  Specifically, a state with monopoly power will not feel 
the same pressure to lower tax rates to attract and maintain individuals.  In addition, the 
state with monopoly power is not as concerned with the tax rates set in other states.  State 
policymakers have long been concerned with the potential for their state’s tax policy to 
drive away residents and prevent non-residents from locating in the state.  These fears 
potentially play a large role in the tax rate choices made by state policymakers.  Results 
using a panel of state data from 1993-2004 confirm both hypotheses.  Controlling for the 
simultaneous nature of the migration response and the tax rate decision, a positive 
relationship is found between the net in-migration of a state and the state personal income 
tax rate and the total state tax burden, indicating that a more attractive state is able to 
impose higher tax rates on its residents.  Also a high net in-migration state responds 
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Part 1:  General Introduction 
1 
A relatively new area of research in public economics is concerned with tax 
competition among governments, which occurs when governments levy a tax on a mobile 
tax base.  The general finding in the literature is that governments do not set fiscal 
policies in isolation.  Whether governments set tax rates competitively in order to attract 
the mobile factor or whether governments are subject to yardstick competition pressures, 
the tax rate of a jurisdiction is generally found to depend on that of other jurisdictions.  
One fear of the strategic interaction is that as governments compete for the mobile factor, 
tax rates will be competed to inefficiently low levels, commonly referred to as the “race 
to the bottom.” 
Early theoretical models of tax competition generally began with the assumption 
that factors are perfectly mobile.  Recent theoretical models have offered cases where 
imperfect mobility of factors may alter some of the “race to the bottom” effects of tax 
competition.  For example, businesses may derive benefits from operating in regions that 
provide cost advantages, such as labor market pooling, technological spillovers, or 
proximity to input providers and final demanders.  These advantages of operating in an 
agglomeration may lessen the potential for the business to flee the jurisdiction, allowing 
the jurisdiction to maintain a higher tax rate than would otherwise be possible. 
Individuals may also have mobility constraints from being attached to or attracted 
to a certain region, due to climate or family reasons for example.  Jurisdictions that are 
attractive to residents and non-residents may then be able to sustain higher tax rates as 
residents are not as likely to leave the jurisdiction and non-residents remain attracted to 
the jurisdiction.  As countries around the world become more concerned with how 
mobility of factors has lessened their ability to levy taxes, as evidenced by both the 
2 
OECD and the European Union introducing initiatives in the 1990s to curb “harmful” tax 
competition, it is increasingly important to understand how governments react to each 
other. 
This dissertation hopes to contribute to the literature by examining whether 
aspects of immobility lessen the effects of tax competition pressures.  This is done in two 
separate essays.  The first essay sets out to inform the literature by empirically examining 
whether county governments are able to maintain higher property or sales tax rates in the 
presence of agglomerations.  The second essay sets out to empirically investigate the 
relationship between the attraction of the state and the tax rates of the state.  It is thought 
that a more attractive state, as revealed through higher net migration rates is able to 
maintain higher tax rates on individuals than a low net migration state. 
The evidence in the theoretical literature and in the empirical essays provided in 
this dissertation indicates that governments are able to extract rents from individuals in 
the presence of factor immobility aspects.  This allows for a gap to exist between tax 
rates across jurisdictions.  While this allows the tax rate to remain higher in the 
jurisdiction with the advantage, whether from agglomerations or a preference for the 
jurisdiction, the race to the bottom effect is not immediately clear.  The jurisdiction 
without the ability to extract rent may in fact compete more aggressively for the mobile 
factor and increase the race to the bottom.  The gap between rates may remain, but both 




















Part 2:  Essay 1:  Competitive Tax Rate Setting in the Presence of Agglomerations 
4 
1.A Introduction 
Most of the theoretical literature on capital tax competition has found that tax 
rates on capital are too low, and the resulting provision of public goods is too low as a 
consequence.1  These models build upon the idea that mobile capital is competed for by 
governments through strategically setting tax rates with respect to other jurisdictions.2  
Within these models a “race to the bottom” is predicted in tax rates as governments 
attempt to attract capital.  As capital has increasingly become more mobile and taxes on 
capital continue to exist, researchers have searched for reasons for the remaining capital 
tax. 
A new strand of theoretical research has grown in an attempt to resolve this 
puzzle.  The standard tax competition models mentioned above failed to recognize an 
additional effect that capital mobility might have: the creation of agglomeration 
economies as stressed in the economic geography literature.  That is, firms have 
incentives to locate near other firms if external economies of scale are present.  These 
agglomerations are thought to exist for different reasons including natural advantage, 
labor market pooling, informational spillovers, and proximity to suppliers of inputs or 
proximity to producers of output.  Regardless of the reason for agglomerations, economic 
activities are often found to locate in a concentrated area.3  The question then arises, what 
effects might this have on tax competition? 
                                                          
1 See Wilson (1999) for a thorough survey of capital tax competition. 
2 Strategic interaction in this setting is defined as one government’s maximization problem being dependent 
upon choices made by other governments. 
3 According to the U.S. Census 75% of U.S. citizens live in cities, even though cities only constitute about 
2% of the land area in the continental U.S. 
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 In a number of recent theoretical studies, these agglomerations have been shown 
to allow for a positive tax gap to exist between jurisdictions, potentially mitigating, but 
not necessarily fully offsetting, the negative effects of capital tax competition.  In the 
economic geography literature, firms are found to locate in a concentrated area in order to 
take advantage of the external economies of scale that are present, which leads to 
agglomerations.  The firms are described as locating in the “core” or the “periphery,” 
where firms in the core are defined as enjoying external economies of scale and firms in 
the periphery do not gain from external economies of scale.  The key component of such 
a model is the ability for the firm to earn rent from the agglomeration.  Governments are 
then able to capture a portion of these rents through the imposition of higher capital tax 
rates without the fear of capital fleeing the jurisdiction.  In effect the agglomeration 
forces serve to lessen the mobility of the capital. 
While the agglomeration allows the tax rate to remain higher in the jurisdiction 
with the agglomeration, the race to the bottom effect is not immediately clear.  The 
jurisdiction without the agglomeration may compete more aggressively for capital and 
increase the race to the bottom.  The gap between tax rates may remain, but both tax rates 
may be competed even faster toward the bottom. 
 As regions become more integrated through lower transportation and 
communication costs, there is potential for policymakers to fear the expected race to the 
bottom in capital tax rates.  An understanding of tax policy in the presence of 
agglomeration economies may help shed light on how certain jurisdictions will behave 
under increased interactions and mobility. 
6 
 To date an extensive empirical literature exists in explaining the strategic 
behavior of tax rate setting by governments.  Evidence usually indicates that governments 
behave as strategic complements.  That is, a government will increase its own tax rate in 
response to another government’s tax rate increase.  Luna (2004) estimates both long run 
and short run local sales tax rate equations for counties.  She assumes strategic interaction 
with other counties occurs with a one-year time lag and it occurs simultaneously with the 
state.  She finds a positive response by a county to both the neighboring county rates and 
the state rate.  Rork (2003) examines the competition between states in setting their sales 
tax rates, as well as other tax rates, and finds a negative response of states to their 
neighboring states.  Finally, Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) search for strategic 
competition in property tax rates by local governments in the Boston metropolitan area 
and find either positive or no responses to competing jurisdictions’ tax changes. 
Little empirical research has investigated the effects that agglomerations have on 
tax rates.  If agglomeration rents are present, the downward pressure that capital tax 
competition places on tax rates will be lessened.  Thus, an empirical model describing the 
determination of tax rates for a jurisdiction should include factors representing both tax 
competition and agglomerations.  Egger, et al (2005) found that tax rates are higher in 
countries with larger labor forces (an indication of being located in the core according to 
the paper), which they suggest confirms the theoretical findings of the economic 
geography literature.  In addition, very little attention has been paid to the simultaneity 
that exists if governments set their own tax rates simultaneously.  Given the ability for 
governments to use multiple tax instruments, it might be that the equations explaining the 
7 
tax rate decisions of governments are determined simultaneously requiring use of 
estimation techniques that correct for the potentially correlated error terms. 
This research attempts to help solve this puzzle by examining how county 
governments in Tennessee might attempt to capture agglomeration rents through 
increases in property or sales tax rates, taking into consideration tax competition forces.4  
If an agglomeration of firms does exist in a county and rents are earned, the government 
might attempt to capture a portion of the rents through increasing either the property or 
sales tax rate, or both.5
This study is valuable for several reasons.  First, it provides information regarding 
the relationship between agglomerations and tax rates.  By understanding the role that 
agglomerations play in setting tax rates in a competitive setting, it might be easier to 
predict how different jurisdictions will respond as interactions between them increase.  
Second, much of the empirical literature on tax competition has ignored the simultaneous 
setting of multiple tax instruments.  Given the likelihood that governments do consider all 
instruments when setting each one individually, a simultaneous setting should be 
estimated when possible.  This study takes the simultaneous setting into account by 
accounting for correlated error terms in estimating models for sales and property tax 
rates.  Finally, the level of analysis in this study is the county level.  Given the nature of 
external economies of scale and agglomerations, it might be more realistic to think that 
                                                          
4 In 2002, nearly 93% of county tax revenue in Tennessee was from the property and sales tax (Census of 
Governments, 2002). 
5 Because sales and property tax rates cannot be set independently for consumers and businesses, the ability 
to capture rents from businesses through these tax rates will be lessened.  Even so, the ability for a county 
government to employ tax rates to extract rents from businesses within their jurisdictions is likely to be 
done with sales or property tax rates because of their magnitude.  In addition, there is evidence that workers 
earn rents in the presence of agglomerations, and thus the government might be able to extract a portion of 
their rents, so larger agglomeration economies would still be associated with higher tax rates. 
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potential benefits are more likely to occur at the local level, so the county level focus is 
appropriate.  In addition, mobility of factors plays an important role in tax competition 
models.  Much of the empirical tax competition research has focused on the country or 
state level, so this research provides different results for jurisdictions with relatively 
easier mobility between them. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 1.B describes the relevant 
literature.  The theoretical structure and empirical methodology are discussed in Section 
1.C, followed by descriptions of the data in Section 1.D.  Results are presented in Section 
1.E and Section 1.F concludes. 
1.B Relevant Literature 
As the paper is focused on understanding the relationship between agglomerations 
and tax rates, two important questions are first addressed to frame the analysis.  First, 
why might tax interdependencies exist and how are they tested for?  Different theories 
explaining strategic interaction are consulted for guidance in approaching these 
questions.  Appropriate definitions of “competitors” are considered and econometric 
issues associated with the simultaneous setting of tax rates by “competitors” are 
addressed before estimation.  Also, if county governments compete with one another for 
firms, then the capital tax competition literature is relevant.  In an attempt to guide the 
study, this paper draws on the rather extensive literature on empirically estimating 
strategic tax rate setting.6
                                                          
6 See Brueckner (2003) for a summary of the empirical literature. 
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A second issue is whether firms benefit from locating near one another and how 
these agglomeration economies are measured.  An extensive literature is consulted 
explaining the nature and effects of agglomerations.  While little is empirically known 
about the effects of agglomerations on tax rates, other studies have examined the effects 
of agglomerations on variables such as wages and productivity.  These studies help guide 
the decision on the best way to measure the presence of agglomerations. 
Tax Competition Models 
Standard Tax Competition.  The standard theoretical explanation for capital tax 
competition arises because of capital mobility.7  Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and 
Wilson (1986) were among the first to formally examine tax competition for capital 
between governments.  In the case of capital tax competition, governments compete for a 
fixed level of capital by luring capital into the jurisdiction with lower capital tax rates.  
The end result of the theory is a race to the bottom between governments with respect to 
capital tax rates. 
Because of the assumption of fixed capital supply, an outflow of capital resulting 
from an increase in tax rates from one jurisdiction represents an inflow into the other 
jurisdiction.  Thus, the optimization problem for the government consists of the tax rates 
of its own jurisdiction as well as tax rates of the other jurisdiction.  In other words, 
governments behave strategically when setting capital tax rates. 
 Yardstick Competition.  In addition to tax competition arising from factor 
mobility, the theory of yardstick competition provides another explanation for strategic 
                                                          
7 Because this paper is primarily concerned with tax competition for capital, discussion of commodity tax 
competition is excluded.  For important contributions to the literature, see Mintz and Tulkens (1986) and 
Kanbur and Keen (1993). 
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interaction between governments.  Besley and Case (1995) propose a model of tax setting 
in the presence of multiple jurisdictions, where asymmetric information regarding the 
politicians’ decisions exists between voters and politicians.  As a result, voters make 
decisions about politicians’ abilities to set taxes and expenditures in a relative way; that 
is, a politician’s performance is measured relative to politicians from other jurisdictions.  
In this world, a voter may not mind that her taxes are rising if voters from other 
jurisdictions are experiencing similar tax increases.  Because voters decide whether or not 
to vote for an incumbent based on their jurisdiction’s taxes compared with other 
jurisdictions’, incumbents may consider other jurisdictions’ tax rates before setting their 
own tax rate. 
Agglomerations 
As far back as Marshall (1920) researchers have studied the incentives for firms 
to locate near each other and form what is called an agglomeration.  Agglomeration 
economies are thought to benefit a firm to the extent that locating within the 
agglomeration lowers the cost of operating the firm because of positive externalities from 
the agglomeration.  This is usually thought to occur through a number of avenues.  The 
presence of a trained labor force, or labor market pooling, makes the cost of hiring and 
training new employees relatively cheaper.  Knowledge spillovers exist to the extent that 
technological advancements developed in one firm spread to surrounding firms at a lower 
cost than transmitting over greater distances.  The proximity of firms to producers of 
intermediate inputs and to the final demanders of a firm’s output lowers the cost of 
production as well. 
11 
One of the most commonly disputed dimensions of agglomeration economies is 
the scope of the externality.  The literature has generally labeled the scope of the 
agglomerations into three categories: (1) internal economies of scale, (2) economies of 
scale external to the firm but internal to the industry (localization economies) and (3) 
economies of scale that are external to the firm and the industry (urbanization 
economies).8  An additional line of disagreement is over the geographic scope of the 
externality with some arguing that any benefits from externalities occur at a very 
localized level, thus discussions of agglomeration economies should not extend to too 
great a geographic size (Rosenthal and Strange (2003b). 
Localization economies are often attributed to Marshall who envisioned local 
clusters of industries: 
When an industry has thus chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there 
long: so great are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade 
get from near neighbourhood to one another…Employers are apt to resort to any 
place where they are likely to find a good choice of workers with the special skill 
they require.  (Marshall (1920), p. 271) 
 
Researchers have generally suggested that Marshall’s thinking indicates that external 
economies of scale might arise from labor market pooling.  It has also been suggested 
that localization economies are beneficial to industries through increased communication, 
leading to relatively cheaper transmission of technological spillovers.  Current examples 
of localized economies often offered are Silicon Valley, the carpet industry in North 
Georgia and the furniture industry in Western North Carolina. 
                                                          
8 See Eberts and McMillen (1999) for a discussion of the different scopes of agglomerations. 
12 
 In contrast to Marshall’s view of specialized industrial clusters being 
advantageous to businesses, Jacobs (1969) stressed the importance of urban diversity.  
She conjectured that the presence of diversity in a region promotes innovation across 
industries.9
A relatively large body of literature exists examining the role that localization and 
urbanization economies have on the productivity of a region as well as the role that 
agglomerations play in the location of economic activity, such as foreign direct 
investment.  The former studies generally show that localization economies have 
significant positive impacts on productivity while urbanization economies have less of an 
impact (Nakamura (1985), Henderson (1986) and Rosenthal and Strange (2003a)).  The 
economic activity location literature has also found that economic activity is more likely 
to locate near other similar activities, which is evidence of localization economies (Head, 
et al. (1995) and Hilber and Voicu (2006)). 
The literature has proposed several different measures of agglomeration 
economies depending on whether the measure is attempting to measure localization or 
urbanization economies.  The theoretical microfoundations of agglomeration economies 
provide the best guide to choosing an appropriate measure.  Unfortunately, it is the 
benefits that arise from labor market pooling, technological spillovers or diversity that are 
responsible for the externalities.  Because it is not possible to measure the benefit that a 
firm receives from these sources, the literature has done its best to derive appropriate 
measures of an agglomeration.  Because the impact of agglomeration economies can 
                                                          
9 See van der Panne (2004) for a recent discussion of the differences between Marshallian and Jacobian 
externalities and the relevant literature supporting each argument. 
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originate through a number of avenues, it is best to consider several different 
agglomeration measures. 
Glaeser, et al. (1992) examines agglomeration impacts by estimating the impact 
that local industrial specialization and diversity has on a city’s growth.  In order to 
measure specialization of an industry in an area, they used a location quotient for industry 










tionspecializa =       (1) 
where e is the number of jobs in an industry, E is the total number of jobs and the 
subscripts i, s and t denote counties, the United States and year, respectively.  The 
variable measures how specialized an industry is in a county relative to how it would be 
if the industry was randomly spread across the U.S.10
 While this variable is an easily derived measure, Rosenthal and Strange (2003b) 
discuss some potential problems with it.  One of the primary concerns with such a 
measure of specialization is the issue of relative versus absolute effects of industry 
concentration.  Microfoundation theories of agglomeration economies primarily rely 
upon the absolute scale of an industry providing benefits to a region as opposed to the 
relative scale of the industry.  While the theory of localization economies does not speak 
directly to effects of the relative share of the industry in the county, there are benefits to 
the measure.  Primarily, the share variable can be viewed as a net effect.  That is, large 
                                                          
10 An identical measure was calculated with county employment relative to Tennessee employment.  
Models discussed below were conducted with the measure and results remained consistent with those 
discussed in the paper.  The national ratio was used to remain consistent with the majority of the literature 
(Glaeser, et al (1992) and Gabe (2005)). 
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absolute size of industry in a county is suggestive of localization economies but being 
small in relative size implies that there is substantial additional activity in the area that 
might introduce congestion costs.  As a result, the relative size of the industry captures 
the benefits of the localization economies, excluding any congestion costs. 
 As discussed above, the urbanization economies may also play an important role 
in providing external economy of scale benefits to a region.  One variable commonly 
used in the literature to examine whether urbanization economies have an impact is the 
population of the region.  Early studies on the origin and productivity of cities 
(Sveikauskas (1975), Segal (1976) and Moomaw (1981)) used population size to measure 
the benefits of a density of economic activity.  More recent studies have viewed diversity 
of economic activity as a more appropriate measure of Jacobs’ urbanization economies 
theory.  These studies typically employ a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of 
employment diversity generally measured as, ∑ 2its , where s is the share of employment 
in industry i.  Examples of such queries generally find that diversity of industry within a 
jurisdiction broadly encourages growth (Glaeser, et al (1992)), encourages growth of 
high-tech firms (Henderson, et al (1995)) and encourages firm births (Rosenthal and 
Strange (2003a)).11
Together the literature offers many insights but also leaves many unanswered 
questions.  While the empirical literature has made important gains in understanding 
strategic interaction between governments, it has largely neglected the simultaneous 
                                                          
11 One of the more recent indices used in examining whether an industry is agglomerated is the one 
developed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997).  This index requires the use of plant level data within industries, 
which are not always available in rural counties.  For this purpose the index is not used in this study, but is 
a possible alternative for any further investigations of the impact of agglomerations on tax policy at a MSA 
level. 
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setting of multiple tax instruments and the presence of agglomerations.  This paper 
contributes to the existing literature on tax competition primarily by addressing these 
issues.  The tax competition literature suggests that county governments would be 
hesitant to set tax rates too high out of fear that capital would flee the jurisdiction.  
Because of this fear, county governments might be expected to set tax rates as strategic 
complements with other counties.  If agglomerations exist, capital is less likely to flee so 
the governments can set higher tax rates without the fear of a capital outflow.  As a result, 
county governments will be able to impose higher tax rates in the presence of 
agglomeration economies. 
1.C Modeling Framework 
Krugman’s (1991) study of the “new economic geography” led to renewed 
interest in the notion of agglomerations and led to several studies that recognized the 
potential for agglomeration economies to alter the general findings from the tax 
competition literature (Kind, et al (1998 and 2000), Ludema and Wooton (2000) and 
Baldwin and Krugman (2004)).  These papers recognized that the capital mobility driving 
the tax competition models also potentially leads to the formation of agglomerations. 
The earning of rent in an agglomeration then offers governments an opportunity 
to forestall the race to the bottom in capital tax rates.  Given that there is evidence of 
firms earning rents in the presence of agglomerations, it follows that governments might 
then attempt to raise the tax rates paid by the firms to capture a portion of the rents.  This 
will offset the race to the bottom that is predicted in the standard tax competition models.  
The following sections present the standard tax competition model followed by some 
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insights from tax competition in the presence of agglomeration economies.  In contrast, 
the presence of the agglomerations may expedite the race to the bottom in capital tax 
rates.  The jurisdiction without the agglomeration benefits may compete more vigorously 
for the capital.  Because too great of a gap in tax rates will cause capital outflow, the 
jurisdiction with the agglomeration will have to lower its rates as well to maintain the 
gap. 
Standard Tax Competition Model 
The basic tax competition model employed here considers a two-region (i and j) 
version of the standard Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) model.  Each region has three 
sectors: a production sector, a household sector and a public sector.  Mobile capital (K) 
and immobile labor (L) are assumed to be the only two inputs used in production.  
Households are assumed to supply the labor or own the capital used in production.  The 
production process is described by  which can be rewritten as ),( ii LKF
 , , )( ii kfy = 0)( >′ ikf 0)( <′′ ikf     (2) 
where y is the output to labor ratio and k is the capital-labor ratio.12
 The utility of a representative household is given by 



















u   (3) 
where x and g are private and public good consumption, respectively.  The household’s 
budget constraint is given by 
 )1)()()(( iiiii tkkkfkfx −+′−= ρ      (4) 
                                                          
12 This is allowed assuming that the production function is homogeneous of degree one. 
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where  is the wage received by region i, iii kkfkf )()( ′− ρ  is the net return to capital and 
k  is the proportion of total capital owned by the individual.  Following Baldwin and 
Krugman (2004), it is assumed that all factor income is taxed at the same rate, t.  The 
amount of the public good available for consumption is equal to the amount of revenue 
raised by the government, given by iii ktg = , where  is the tax rate on capital. it
Perfect Capital Mobility.  The total amount of capital in the world,  is given by 
the sum of capital in both regions, 
wk
wji kkk =+ .  When capital is perfectly mobile, 
owners of the capital can move capital outside of one region into the other if the net rates 
of return are different.  When the net return to capital is equal in both regions, there will 
be no incentive for capital to flee, thus the outcome is characterized by the condition 
 )1)(()1)(( jjii tkftkf −′=−′ .     (5) 
 An increase in the tax rate by region i will cause an outflow of capital from i to j, 
and a subsequent increase in the gross return to capital in region i and a decrease in the 
gross return to capital in region j.  The elasticity of capital in region i with respect to its 
tax rate )(
ik













ε .    (6) 
The negative sign on the elasticity indicates that capital will flee the jurisdiction given a 
higher tax rate. 
 In the standard tax competition models, it is assumed that governments play a 
Nash game in setting tax rates.  Specifically, governments are assumed to maximize the 
representative household’s utility, subject to the household and government budget 
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constraints, also taking the other jurisdiction’s tax rate as given.  The first order condition 
of the optimization problem gives the marginal rate of substitution between the public 
































    (7) 
where kkkfkfm iiii ρ+′−= )()( .  The key conclusion of the models is that the marginal 
cost of increasing the public good (given by the right side of equation (7)) can be shown 
to be greater than one because of the capital outflow resulting from an increase in the tax 
rate.  As a result, the governments are shown to set tax rates on capital inefficiently low. 
Agglomeration Model.  An assortment of new economic geography models shows 
scenarios where tax competition does not lead to a race to inefficiently low capital tax 
rates (Ludema and Wooten (2000), Kind, et al. (2000) and Baldwin and Krugman 
(2004)).  These models generally conclude that a tax can be levied on a mobile factor 
because of the existence of rents from agglomerations.  These models find that all 
economic activity locates in one region and the return to capital is higher in the presence 
of the agglomeration than the potential return in other regions.  This allows for a higher 
tax in the region with the agglomeration without causing an outflow of capital. 
 Following Krogstrup (2004) the positive tax difference in the presence of 
agglomerations is demonstrated with the use of production under external economies of 
scale.  Assume that capital is the only factor of production and that there is a positive 
second derivative of the economy-wide production function: 
 , , )( ii kfy = 0)( >′ ikf 0)( >′′ ikf , 0)0( =f .  (8) 
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It is assumed that individual firms continue to operate in a perfect competition 
environment and earn zero profits.  A unit of capital under the presence of increasing 








= .        (9) 
 Perfect Capital Mobility with Agglomeration Economies.  The presence of 
external economies of scale leads to some differences in the findings of the standard tax 
competition model.  In this model, a capital outflow from jurisdiction i to j will increase 
the productivity of capital in j and will lead to more capital flow to j until all capital is in 
the jurisdiction.  The tax competition game in this setting again begins with governments 
simultaneously choosing their tax rates to maximize the representative household’s 
utility, taking the tax rate of the other jurisdiction as constant.  If a difference exists in the 
net return to capital, capital will migrate into the region with the higher net return until all 
capital locates in one region. 
 In this core-periphery model of the game, all capital is located for production in 
one region only.  Because owners of capital can live in either jurisdiction, the income of 






















)(      (10) 
where c and p subscripts represent the core and periphery jurisdictions, respectively.  Tax 
revenues are given by 
  and       (11) wcc ktg =
 .        (12) 0=pg
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 Under the core-periphery setting, the core is able to impose taxes on capital as 
long as the tax difference does not exceed the difference between the gross return to 
capital in the core and the potential gross return to capital in the periphery.  The upper 
limit of the tax rate is given by the difference in the average return to capital when all 





, and the marginal return to capital when it is the first 









The key result is that  is positive, which results from the average product of capital 
being greater than the marginal product of capital when the production function enjoys 
increasing returns to scale. 
ut
 If the tax rate is set above this upper limit, capital will flee the core jurisdiction 
into the periphery and, given the increasing returns to scale, will continue until all capital 
has relocated into the new jurisdiction.  To prevent this from happening, the core sets a 
tax rate on capital that is greater than zero but less than . ut
 Standard tax competition models suggest that jurisdictions will compete for 
mobile capital by setting tax rates that are inefficiently low with resulting inefficiently 
low public good provision.  Allowing for the presence of agglomerations enables one 
jurisdiction to maintain a positive tax difference over the other jurisdiction without fear 
of capital fleeing the jurisdiction. 
Building upon the theoretical structure the empirical literature on tax competition 
has generally proposed reaction functions of the form 
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where s and p are the county sales and property tax rates, respectively, A is a vector of 
agglomeration measures, X and Z are vectors of control variables and ε  and u are error 
terms.13  As described in Brueckner (2003), estimation of the above equations does not 
allow one to attribute competition to standard capital tax competition or yardstick 
competition pressures.  This is investigated in a later section. 
Neighbor Specification 
Before estimation of equations (13) and (14), assignment of counties as 
competitors must be completed.  The term ∑
≠ij
jtij tω , pst ,= , serves to aggregate the 
competing neighboring counties’ tax rates, where ijω  defines which counties are 
competitors and is specified a priori.  Given that the interest of the paper is how counties 
set tax rates to attract businesses, what counties should be considered as competitors?  
The best way to define a jurisdiction’s competitors depends upon the theoretical 
framework for the competition: capital tax competition or yardstick competition.  If one 
considers standard tax competition to be the appropriate theory and to remain consistent 
with most literature, geographical neighbors might be a natural starting point, especially 
if the ability to move between jurisdictions is relatively easier in closer proximities.  If 
bordering counties are the competitors the spatial weight term, ijω , is defined as the 
following: 1=ijω  if counties i and j are contiguous and zero otherwise.  The matrix is 
                                                          
13 See Rork (2003) for a recent example. 
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row-standardized, meaning the sum of the weights equals one, so the term  
becomes the average of the neighbors’ tax rates.  This is referred to as the simple 




Because tax competition might result from movement of factors across 
jurisdictions, one can also imagine that a county might be more concerned with the 
actions of its more populous neighbors.  Thus, it would place more weight on its 
neighbors that are more heavily populated.  This leads to the population-contiguity 
matrix.  It continues to define only the counties that border a county as neighbors, but the 
counties are given different weights based upon the proportion of the county’s population 
to the entire bordering population.  Again, the matrix is row-standardized so the term 
 becomes a population-weighted average of the neighbors’ tax rates and is 




It is also possible that counties consider other demographically or economically 
similar counties when setting tax rates as opposed to just physical neighbors.  For 
example, Fletcher and Murray (2006) recently investigated the strategic setting of sales 
tax bases by states using different definitions of neighbors, including contiguity 
definitions, and found that non-geographic competition can be important. 
If yardstick competition is the theory explaining strategic interaction, the non-
geographic definition of neighbors might be even more important.  Given the fact that 
politicians are judged based upon their relative performance, it might be that politicians 
consider other jurisdictions that contain similar median voters.  To allow for this, a 
weight matrix is specified such that a county’s competitors continue to be only bordering 
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counties, but more weight is placed on the counties with similar per capita incomes.  
Specifically, the weight applied to each county is the reciprocal of the absolute value of 
the difference in per capita income and again the matrix is row-standardized (Case, Rosen 
and Hines (1993) and Fletcher and Murray (2006). 
As agglomerations play a key role in the location of capital, one might expect that 
counties with similar industrial structures compete for capital.  For example, if a 
manufacturing firm is earning significant rents in an agglomeration it will not want to flee 
a jurisdiction unless another jurisdiction contains similar agglomeration externalities or 
sufficiently compensates with a lower tax rate.  Here neighbors continue to be defined as 
only bordering counties, but more weight is placed on the neighbors with more similar 
industry diversity.14
Econometric Issues 
Several econometric issues raised by Brueckner (2003) are addressed before 
estimating equations (13) and (14).  First, because it is hypothesized that counties set tax 
rates strategically, the tax rates on the right hand side of the equations are endogenous.  
Simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation would lead to inconsistent estimates of 
the parameters.  The literature commonly uses one of two estimation methods for 
equations (13) and (14).  The first method inverts the equations and then estimates the 
model using maximum likelihood (ML) techniques and the second uses instrumental 
variables (IV) methods.  The ML approach has been used by a number of studies, but if 
spatial error dependence is present, this approach may lead to spurious results.  Following 
                                                          
14 The theoretical model suggests that tax rates depend upon agglomeration measures.  Including the 
agglomeration measure as a spatial weight introduces potential endogeneity, so the weights are lagged by 
one year. 
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Brueckner (2003), the IV approach involves regressing ∑
≠ij
jtij tω  on X and  and 








jtij tω .  Both of these approaches 
will lead to consistent estimates of the parameters.15
 A second problem involves the potential spatial error dependence that exists in 
estimating equations (13) and (14).  If spatial error dependence is present, the error vector 
is defined by 
 μελε += W         (15) 
where W is the weight matrix, μ is a well-behaved error vector and λ  is an unknown 
parameter.  If spatial dependence is ignored, the estimated finding of strategic interaction 
may be misleading.  Spatial dependence in the error may induce correlation in the tax 
rates even though strategic interaction may not be present.  Kelejian and Prucha (1998) 
show that reliance upon the IV estimation technique leads to consistent estimates even in 
the presence of spatial error dependence.  Because the IV approach eliminates the 
problem of spatial error dependence, it is the method used in this study. 
 An additional problem is that counties set their tax rates within the same setting; 
therefore, the error term in the sales tax rate could be correlated with the error term in the 
property tax rate equation.  As a result, the two-equation system is be estimated using 
three stage least squares (3SLS), which involves estimating the system of equations with 
                                                          
15 Before a 2SLS approach is taken, proper tests of endogeneity will be performed as suggested by 
Hausman (1978). 
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generalized least squares (GLS) after the system of equations has been estimated with 
two stage least squares (2SLS) methods.16
1.D Data 
Tax Rates 
This research hopes to help inform the literature on whether local governments 
might attempt to capture agglomeration rents through increases in property or sales tax 
rates, taking into consideration tax competition forces.  County governments in 
Tennessee are the level of government chosen here for a couple of reasons.  First, given 
the concern of extending the benefits of agglomerations to too large a geographic area 
(Rosenthal and Strange (2003b)), research on the effects of agglomerations is more 
worthwhile at the county level.  Second, the majority of the tax competition literature has 
focused on either the country or state level.  While such investigations are interesting, the 
relative ease of mobility between counties, due to the close geographic proximity and 
similar cultural environments, suggests that the tax competitive pressures might differ at 
the county level. 
The use of Tennessee data here does not necessarily provide parallels to all other 
states.  Certainly the use of property taxes at the local level is not unique to Tennessee.  
According to the U.S. Census of Governments, local governments collected nearly 97 
percent of state and local property tax revenue in 2004.  In contrast, local governments 
collected less than 20 percent of state and local sales tax revenue in 2004.  Even though 
roughly 30 states allow localities to impose sales tax rates, only about 15 of these states 
                                                          
16 See Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) for similar methodology. 
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permit any variation in the tax rates chosen by localities.  The use of Tennessee data is 
still useful here for informing the literature on local property tax competition at the 
county level.  While not all states allow local option sales tax rate variation, the research 
here remains important in informing how sales tax rates are set in such a setting.  The 
panel of data used here will consist of the property and sales taxes from 1993- 2003, 
which are the primary taxes paid by businesses.17  Tables 1.1 and 1.2 (all tables and 
figures provided in appendix) include descriptions, sources and summary statistics of the 
data used in this study. 
The property tax paid in Tennessee counties is levied on real and personal 
property by county and municipal governments.  The amount of property tax paid 
depends on three factors: the appraisal value set by the county assessor, the level of 
assessment set by the state and the tax rate set by the locality.  The tax rate a business 
pays depends upon what type of property the property is as real and personal property are 
assessed at different percentages.  After the property has been properly appraised and 
assessed, the tax rate is applied to the value.  The effective rate paid by a firm on property 
is Effective rate = Statutory rate x Appraisal ratio x Assessment level.  To best test 
whether county governments attempt to capture agglomeration rents from businesses, this 
paper will look at effective tax rates on real commercial and industrial property. 
                                                          
17 As Ring (1999) shows, more than 40 percent of sales tax revenue is derived from purchases made by 
businesses.  Also, Cline, et al. (2004) find that in 2003 property taxes on business property and general 
sales taxes on business inputs account for over 60% of the total state and local business taxes paid by 
businesses. 
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Tennessee imposes a sales tax on all retail sales, leases and rentals of most goods, 
as well as taxable services.18  The sales tax paid in Tennessee is a combination of the 
state rate and the local option rate imposed by county and/or city governments.  The 
Tennessee state sales tax rate is applied equally across all counties within the state.  The 
state sales tax rate was 6 percent in 1993 and was increased to 7 percent in 2003 except 
for grocery sales. 
The counties then have the option of imposing an additional sales tax rate up to a 
state determined maximum on top of the state rate.  The maximum rate is 2.75 percent 
throughout the panel and in 2003, 31 of the 95 counties imposed the maximum.  For this 
reason, a dummy variable for whether the local sales tax rate is at the maximum is 
included in the sales tax rate equations.  If a county does not impose the maximum rate, 
internal city governments then have the option to impose a rate less than or equal to the 
difference between the state-imposed maximum rate and the county rate.19  Figure 1.1 
displays the change in the averages of the local sales tax rate and the effective property 
tax rate on real commercial and industrial property over the panel.  One can see an 
increase in the sales tax rate over time coupled with a slight decrease in the property tax 
rate over the time period. 
Agglomeration Measures 
As discussed above, there is disagreement whether benefits from agglomeration 
occur because of localization or urbanization economies.  As a result, a number of 
                                                          
18 All Tennessee sales tax information is obtained from the Tennessee Department of Revenue Sales and 
Use Tax Guide (2003).  For a more thorough description of Tennessee taxes, see also the Tennessee Tax 
Guide (2003). 
19 According to Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 67-6-703 (a) (1), “The levy of the tax by a county shall 
preclude, to the extent of the county tax, any city or town within such county from levying the tax.” 
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agglomeration variables have been used to measure the impact of an agglomeration on a 
firm.  This research follows the past literature by allowing both specialization and 
diversity to play a role. 
As described above, localization economies exist to the extent that firms operating 
in close proximity to other firms within the same industry enjoy external benefits.  In 
order to measure the concentration of an industry in a county, this paper will use a 









=       (16) 
where e is the number of jobs in an industry, E is the total number of jobs and the 
subscripts i and s represents counties and the United States.20  Given the small size of 
some counties, data on all industries are not always readily available.  For this reason, the 
measure is calculated for the specialization of the manufacturing, retail trade and service 
sectors in each county.21  This variable measures how specialized the county is in the 
industry relative to how specialized it would be if spread randomly across the U.S. with a 
larger number representing more specialization in the industry. 
As seen in Table 1.2, the maximum value in 2003 is 3.17 for manufacturing 
specialization, 1.66 for retail specialization and 1.12 for service specialization.  If 
industry specialization provides benefits to a firm operating within the agglomeration, it 
is expected that tax rates would be higher in counties with more industrial specialization.  
                                                          
20 Because of the possibility that firms and the resulting jobs locate in an area due to the tax policy, it is 
possible that the industrial specialization measure is endogenous to the tax rate.  As a result, the 
specialization variables are lagged by one period in the estimation. 
21 The manufacturing, retail and service industries combine for over 60% of the total jobs for the state of 
Tennessee (BEA).  Even limiting the industries to these three, several gaps remained in the panel and were 
filled by linearly interpolating the data. 
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As discussed above, it is not necessarily the relative size of the industry in the region, but 
potentially the absolute size of the industry.  As a result, total county jobs in the 
manufacturing, retail and service sectors are included in an additional specification for 
robustness tests. 
 In addition to including measures for localization economies, urbanization 
economy variables are included.  Jacobian externalities suggest that diversity of industry 
provides benefits to firms located within the diverse environment.  For this purpose, a 
Herfindahl-type index, similar to that used in Henderson, et al. (1995) and Rosenthal and 
Strange (2003a), is included to capture this effect.  This is given by  where s is 
defined as industry i’s share of total employment in county i.  Again, because data on all 
industries are not available for every county, the industries examined are manufacturing, 
retail trade and service.  A higher measure of the HHI-type index suggests a lack of job 
diversity in the county.  If diversity provides external benefits to firms operating within 
the agglomeration, as in Jacobs’ theory, it is expected that the industry diversity variable 
would have a negative effect on the tax rate. 
∑ 2is
 The final measure of agglomerations is the population of a county.  Early studies 
demonstrated that areas with large populations are positively associated with growth 
(Sveikauskas (1975), Segal (1976) and Moomaw (1981)), therefore a larger population 
might provide external benefits to firms with the potential for the government to extract 





Theoretical models of tax competition and agglomerations described above 
suggest that other variables besides the neighbors’ rates and agglomeration factors might 
affect the tax rates, so they must be included in the estimation procedure.  County 
unemployment rates are included because prior studies have shown that economic 
characteristics affect tax decisions.  It might be expected that higher unemployment rates 
are signs of fiscal stress, so a positive sign might be expected.  Per capita income, percent 
of population between ages 5 and 17, percent of the population over age 65 and 
population density are included to account for effects of demographic characteristics on 
tax rates. 
On one hand, higher income individuals might prefer the sales tax relative to other 
taxes because of its regressive nature.  On the other hand, higher income individuals 
might consume a relatively large amount of taxable goods, so a lower sales tax rate is 
allowed.  If high-income individuals live in higher valued property, then the tax rate on 
property might be lower because of the larger base.  Individuals between the ages of 5 
and 17 and over 65 are often larger consumers of public services; thus a higher sales or 
property tax rate might be expected to meet the higher demand.  Tennessee’s requirement 
that one-half of local sales tax revenue be targeted for education may be consistent with 
this expectation.  In addition to firms benefiting from operating in an agglomeration, 
evidence shows that workers are potentially benefactors of this increased productivity in 
the form of higher wages (Ciccone and Hall (1996)).  If employees of the productive 
firms capture some of the rent, then the government may not be able to capture any 
leading to a lower tax rate. 
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In addition, government services will play a role in the setting of the tax rate.  It 
might be expected that a higher tax rate will be permitted if government services received 
from the tax revenue are substantial, so per capita county government expenditures are 
included.22
County and year dummy variables are included to control for unobserved county- 
and time-specific characteristics that are time invariant.  Finally, dummies are included 




Results for the baseline 3SLS estimations of equations (13) and (14) are presented 
in Table 1.3 with the columns separated according to the competitor specifications.24  
Before discussing specific results, it can be said that generally, county governments 
behave strategically with other county governments.  When coefficient estimates on the 
neighbor’s tax rate are statistically significant, the estimates are positive indicating that 
county governments behave as strategic complements.  Results from the first regressions 
do not provide any specific tax competition theory to the strategic interaction. 
An interesting finding also appears with respect to the specialization of 
manufacturing in the county.  Greater manufacturing specialization in a county is 
                                                          
22 Expenditures are included in per capita terms to eliminate scale issues arising from larger counties 
requiring more government services. 
23 The tax base is not explicitly controlled for in the initial models.  Instead, proxies for the base, such as 
income and demographic characteristics are included.  This is further examined in a later section. 
24 Regular OLS and IV results are presented in Appendix Tables 1.1 and 1.2 for comparison to the 3SLS 
coefficient estimates.  It can be noted that coefficient estimates from the IV and 3SLS estimates are very 
similar. 
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consistently associated with higher property tax rates and occasionally with lower sales 
tax rates.  This suggests that firms may be earning rents from locating in areas with a 
concentration of manufacturing firms and that county governments are able to extract a 
portion of the rents through higher property tax rates.  However, counties with more 
specialization in the manufacturing sector are also found to have lower sales tax rates.  
The coefficient estimate on the measure of overall industry diversity is not significant in 
any of the specifications. 
Sales Tax Rates.  Evidence from two of the four neighbor specifications suggests 
that counties behave as strategic complements with respect to sales tax rates.  Coefficient 
estimates are positive and statistically significant with magnitudes around 0.6.  These 
suggest that a one percentage point increase in the average of the neighbors’ sales tax rate 
would provoke a 0.60 percentage point increase in the county’s own sales tax rate.  These 
results are consistent with the positive coefficient estimates found in Luna (2004) but 
differ from the finding that states behave as strategic substitutes (indicated by the 
negative and significant coefficient estimate) with respect to sales tax rates in Rork 
(2003).  These results indicate that the level of government is important in examining 
strategic behavior even with identical tax instruments. 
As mentioned above, sales tax rates are negatively correlated with manufacturing 
specialization in two of the four specifications.  The percent of population between the 
ages of 5 and 17 negative and significant in three of the four weight specifications, which 
is counter to what was hypothesized (see discussion of property tax rate below). 
Property Tax Rates.  Evidence from one of the four neighbor specifications 
indicates that counties behave strategically with respect to the property tax rate.  
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Coefficient estimates are positive and significant, again indicating that governments 
behave as strategic complements with respect to property tax rates, consistent with 
Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) and Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998).  The significance of 
the neighbor’s coefficient estimate in the income weight specification might be portrayed 
as more of a yardstick competition setting as discussed above, so these results are 
potential evidence that property tax rates compete through yardstick pressures, which will 
be explored in the next section.  It might also be that if property is intending to flee a 
county, it might be expected that it would flee to a more economically similar county. 
Evidence from all specifications suggests that the specialization of manufacturing 
plays an important role in the setting of the property tax rate.  Manufacturing 
specialization is positively correlated with property tax rates in all specifications.  If 
locating in an area with a specialized industry is a source of positive externalities for a 
firm within the industry or for all firms, then the positive correlation indicates that county 
governments are potentially able to extract a portion of the rents earned from firms 
operating in these localization economies. 
The percent of population between the ages of 5 and 17 is always positive and 
significant, potentially as a result of the use of property tax revenue as a large source of 
revenue for education.  A higher proportion of an older population is negatively 
associated with property tax rates, which might result from the lack of concern of the 
older population with education, which is financed so heavily by property tax revenues. 
Robustness Checks 
 As discussed above, one concern with the industry specialization variables used in 
the baseline models is that models of agglomeration benefits do not necessarily indicate 
34 
that relative scale of the industry provides benefits to the industry.25  Instead, benefits are 
often thought to arise from absolute size of the industry in the region.  To examine this, 
Table 1.4 includes estimates with the absolute size of the manufacturing, retail and 
service sectors, as opposed to the relative size of the industry. 
 Results continue to indicate that county governments behave as strategic 
complements with respect to both sales and property tax rates.  Coefficient estimates on 
the property tax rate are positive and statistically significant in all weight specifications, 
but are positive and significant in only two of the four weight specifications with respect 
to the sales tax rate.  However, estimated agglomeration parameters differ from the 
baseline specification.  Coefficient estimates on the number of retail jobs in the county 
are positive and significant in the property tax rate equation in three of the four weight 
specifications, while the manufacturing jobs parameter estimates are negative and 
significant in three of the four weight specifications.  In addition, coefficient estimates on 
the number of service jobs in the county are positive and significant in all four weight 
specifications. 
 If locating in an area with a large number of retail and service jobs is a source of 
positive externalities for a firm, then the positive correlation indicates that county 
governments are potentially able to extract a portion of the rents earned from firms 
operating in these localization economies. 
 The difference in the results may be the result of the ability to export taxes in the 
presence of a large percentage of manufacturing firms.  As discussed in McLure (1967) 
                                                          
25 As discussed above, the relative size of the industry is a common measure in the empirical literature and 
does provide some benefits, such as accounting for negative congestion costs (Rosenthal and Strange 
(2003b). 
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and in Gade and Adkins (1990), if manufacturing firms are able to shift some of their tax 
burden on consumers and if consumers are located nationally, then high taxes on 
manufacturing firms, such as a high property tax rate, allows the jurisdiction to export a 
significant portion of the overall tax burden.  Therefore, the results in Table 2.3 might 
actually be indication that county governments are attempting to export tax burdens as 
opposed to capturing agglomeration rents. 
 These results also provide evidence that sales tax rates are higher in a more 
diversified economy.  Coefficient estimates on the industry diversity variable are negative 
and significant in two weight specifications.  If firms gain external benefits from being 
located in a diversified economy as suggested by Jacobs (1969), the higher sales tax rate 
may be used to extract some rent from these firms. 
Yardstick Competition 
 Evidence from the baseline 3SLS result with the income-weighted average weight 
suggests that yardstick competition might be the theory behind the strategic interaction 
between county governments when setting property tax rates.  As proposed in Brueckner 
(2003), coefficient estimates from the baseline equations presented above cannot be 
specifically attributed to factor mobility tax competition or yardstick competition.  
Brueckner shows that both theoretical structures lead to tax rates in jurisdiction i being a 
function of tax rates in other jurisdictions, leading to the above estimating equations.  
This section investigates a potential method that will allow coefficient estimates to 
signify yardstick competition specifically as opposed to attributing strategic interaction to 
either standard factor mobility tax competition or yardstick competition. 
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Standard tax competition models lead to tax rates being set interdependently because 
the tax rate in one jurisdiction affects the tax bases of other jurisdictions.  If county i 
increases its tax rate, tax base will flee into county j.  The resulting increase in county j’s 
tax base can lead the government to either raise or lower its rate.  If the government 
chooses to maintain its tax revenue, the government can decrease its rate and maintain tax 
revenues.  If the jurisdiction places higher valuation on public versus private goods, then 
an increase in i’s tax rate might be followed by an increase in j’s tax rate. 
Because standard tax competition models and factor mobilities are reflected by 
altering tax bases, if the tax base can be controlled for, any interaction still observed can 
be attributed to yardstick competition.  For this purpose the following equations are 
estimated 




ititititjtijit AXSBss εγααωα 1211




ititititjtijit uAZPBpp δββωβ 1211
where the variables are the same as in equations (13) and (14) with the exception of SB 
and PB, which are defined here as sales and property tax base, respectively.26  Coefficient 
estimates of 1α  and 1β  from equations (17) and (18) should be evidence of yardstick 
competition. 
                                                          
26 Given the ability of governments to raise revenue from multiple sources, governments may be engaged in 
making tax portfolio choices.  For example, a jurisdiction with a significant amount of revenue from the 
property tax may have the ability to impose lower sales tax rates.  For this purpose, models were estimated 
with both tax bases in each equation to control for the tax portfolio choice of governments.  Results remain 
qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 1.4, so are not included. 
37 
 For purposes of simplifying the estimation procedure, it is assumed that a county 
government responds with a one-year time lag in response to its neighbors’ rates.27  In 
order for the coefficient estimates to indicate yardstick competition, a few assumptions 
must hold true.  First, there are only two methods through which tax rates can be 
interdependent – yardstick competition or factor mobility tax competition.  Second, the 
government responds with a one-year time lag whether the strategic interaction is because 
of yardstick pressures or movement of the base.  These two assumptions are summarized 
in Figure 1.2.  If these hold and the tax base is controlled for, any correlation between tit-1 
and tj can be attributed to yardstick competition. 
 Because the neighbor’s tax rate is lagged, it is no longer necessary to estimate the 
equations with 2SLS procedures.  However, it remains that governments set the tax rates 
under similar conditions, resulting in potentially correlated error terms.  For this purpose, 
the system of equation is estimated with seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) methods.  
Results are presented in Table 1.4.28  Generally, evidence indicates that there is positive 
strategic interaction between county governments in setting sales tax rates and 
occasionally in setting property tax rates.  However, the results in these models are 
suggestive of yardstick competition between counties as opposed to factor mobility 
induced tax competition. 
A higher average (even when a weighted average) sales tax rate of bordering counties 
is associated with higher own county sales tax rates in every specification.  Property tax 
                                                          
27 Estimating the model with contemporaneous behavior here is complicated by inclusion of the tax base, 
given its endogeneity with the tax rates. 
28 Results from the SUR method cannot be directly compared to the baseline results, so equations (17) and 
(18) without the base included are estimated with SUR methods and presented in Appendix Table 1.3 for 
comparison. 
38 
rates are positively correlated with neighbor’s property tax rates in two of the settings as 
well.  Consistent with the baseline results, the specialization of manufacturing in a county 
plays an important role in both sales and property tax rates.  As discussed above, the 
share specification might be evidence of tax exporting by counties as opposed to the 
capture of agglomeration rents. 
1.F Conclusion 
Examining the strategic interaction between governments in a federal system is a 
relatively new area of study.  As a result, very few general results are known at this time.  
This research sets out to contribute to the literature by examining how local governments 
behave in the presence of tax competition and agglomerations.  Lessons learned from 
local governments can then be applied to situations where the setting is similar, i.e. 
relatively low transportation cost movement between jurisdictions.  In addition, the 
simultaneous setting of multiple tax instruments is addressed. 
 Baseline results suggest that when strategic interaction exists between county 
governments with respect to setting local sales and property tax rates, the governments 
behave as strategic complements.  That is, governments respond to an increase in their 
competitors’ rates by increasing their own rate.  The positive interaction between 
governments allows for the potential race to the bottom in tax rates. 
 The paper also set out to examine the role that agglomerations play in the setting 
of tax rates.  As proposed by theoretical literature, the presence of agglomerations allows 
firms to earn rents through external economies of scale.  The government then potentially 
captures a portion of these rents.  One way to capture the rents is to impose higher tax 
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rates on businesses.  Because the sales and property taxes are the two largest taxes paid 
by businesses at the state and local level, governments might realistically use these tax 
rates to extract some of the rent from the firms.  Coefficient estimates reveal that property 
tax rates are higher in counties with highly specialized areas of manufacturing 
employment (Table 1.3) or in counties with large absolute numbers of service and retail 
jobs (Table 1.4). 
 Because the microfoundations of agglomerations do not necessarily indicate that 
the relative size of the industry is a source of external benefits, the baseline results may 
not represent potential rent extraction by the government.  The higher property tax rate in 
heavily specialized manufacturing counties may be evidence of tax exporting.  The 
evidence that county governments may extract rent from firms in areas with a large 
number of service jobs might be the result that service jobs are inputs into many firms 
production.  Therefore close proximity to many service jobs lowers one of the firms input 
costs.  In only one model is there evidence that sales tax rates may be used to extract rent 
from firms operating in an agglomeration economy.  This is perhaps not surprising 
because the sales tax rate does not differ for consumers, thus any attempt to extract rent 
from firms through the sales tax rate would also have consequences on consumers. 
 Theoretical predictions from the capital tax competition literature indicate that if 
governments do behave strategically, then capital tax rates will be competed to an 
inefficiently low level.  The presence of agglomeration economies alters the tax 
competition by decreasing the incentive for capital to flee the jurisdiction, thus allowing 
the government to impose higher tax rates in agglomeration economies.  The findings 
from this paper indicate that county governments are able to extract rents from firms in 
40 
the presence of certain agglomeration forces, but the effect that agglomerations have on 
the race to the bottom is not addressed. 
41 
Essay 1: References 
Baldwin, Richard E. and Paul Krugman.  2004.  “Agglomeration, Integration and Tax 
Harmonisation.”  European Economic Review 48: 1-23. 
 
Besley, Timothy and Anne Case.  1995.  “Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-
Setting and Yardstick Competition.”  American Economic Review 85: 25-45. 
 
Brueckner, Jan K.  2003.  “Strategic Interaction Among Governments: An Overview of 
Empirical Studies.”  International Regional Science Review 26: 175-188. 
 
Brueckner, Jan K. and Luz A. Saavedra.  2001.  “Do Local Governments Engage in 
Strategic Property-Tax Competition?”  National Tax Journal 54: 203-229. 
 
Ciccone, C. and R. Hall.  1996.  “Productivity and the Density of Economic Activity.”  
American Economic Review 86: 54-70. 
 
Cline, Robert, William F. Fox, Tom Neubig and Andrew Phillips.  2004.  “Total State 
and Local Business Taxes: A 50-State Study of the Taxes Paid by Business in 
Fiscal 2003.”  State Tax Notes, March 1: 737-750. 
 
Eberts, Randall W. and Daniel P. McMillen.  1999.  “Agglomeration Economies and 
Urban Public Infrastructure.”  Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, E.S. 
Mills and P. Cheshire, eds. 
 
Egger, Peter, Michael Pfaffermayr and Hannes Winner.  2005.  “Commodity Taxation in 
a Linear World: A Spatial Panel Data Approach.”  Regional Science and Urban 
Economics 35: 527-541. 
 
Ellison, Glenn and Edward Glaeser.  1997.  “Geographic Concentration in U.S. 
Manufacturing Industries: A Dartboard Approach.”  Journal of Political Economy 
105: 889-927. 
 
Fletcher, Jason and Matthew N. Murray.  2006.  “Competition Over the Tax Base in the 
State Sales Tax.”  Public Finance Review (Forthcoming). 
 
Gade, Mary N. and Lee C. Adkins.  1991.  “Tax Exporting and State Revenue 
Structures.”  National Tax Journal 43: 39-52. 
 
Glaeser, Edward L., Hedi D. Kallal, Jose A. Scheinkman and Andrei Shleifer.  1992.  
“Growth in Cities.”  Journal of Political Economy 100: 1126-1152. 
 




Head, Keith, John Ries and Deborah Swenson.  1995.  “Agglomeration Benefits and 
Location Choice: Evidence from Japanese Manufacturing Investments in the 
United States.”  Journal of International Economics 38: 223-247. 
 
Henderson, Vernon.  1986.  “Where Does an Industry Locate?”  Journal of Urban 
Economics 35: 83-104. 
 
Henderson, Vernon, Ari Kuncoro and Matt Turner.  1995.  “Industrial Development in 
Cities.”  Journal of Political Economy 103: 1067-1090. 
 
Heyndels, Bruno and Jef Vuchelen.  1998.  “Tax Mimicking Among Belgian 
Municipalities.”  National Tax Journal 51: 89-101. 
 
Hilber, Christian A.L. and Ioan Voicu.  2006.  “Agglomeration Economies and the 
Location of Foreign Direct Investment: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from 
Romania.”  Research Papers in Environmental and Spatial Analysis no. 105. 
 
Jacobs, Jane.  1969.  The Economy of Cities.  Macmillan: London. 
 
Kanbur, Ravi and Michael Keen.  1993.  “Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and 
Tax   Coordination When Countries Differ in Size.”  American Economic Review 
83: 877-892. 
 
Kelejian, Harry and Ingmar Prucha.  1998.  “A Generalized Spatial Two-Stage Least 
Squares Procedure for Estimating a Spatial Autoregressive Model with 
Autoregressive Disturbances.”  Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 
17: 99-121. 
 
Kind, Hans Jarle, Karen Helene Midelfart Knarvik and Guttorm Schjelderup.  2000.  
“Competing for Capital in a Lumpy World.”  Journal of Public Economics 78: 
253-274. 
 
Kind, Hans Jarle, Karen Helene Midelfart Knarvik and Guttorm Schjelderup.  1998.  
“Industrial Agglomeration and Capital Taxation.”  Norwegian School of 
Economics, Department of Economics, Discussion Paper 7/98. 
 
Krogstrup, Signe.  2004.  “Increasing Returns in a Standard Tax Competition Model.”  
HEI Working Paper No. 02/2004. 
 
Krugman, Paul.  1991.  “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography.”  Journal of 
Political Economy 99: 483-499. 
 
Ludema, Rodney D. and Ian Wooton.  2000.  “Economic Geography and the Fiscal 




Luna, LeAnn.  2004.  “Local Sales Tax Competition and the Effect on County 
Governments’ Tax Rates and Tax Bases.”  Journal of American Taxation 
Association 26: 43-62. 
 
Marshall, Alfred.  1920.  Principles of Economics.  New York: Macmillan. 
 
McLure, Charles E., Jr.  1967.  “The Interstate Exporting of State and Local Taxes: 
Estimates for 1962.”  National Tax Journal 20: 49-75. 
 
Mintz, Jack, and Henry Tulkens.  1986.  “Commodity Tax Competition Between Member 
States of a Federation: Equilibrium and Efficiency.”  Journal of Public Economics 
29: 133-72. 
 
Moomaw, Ronald.  1981.  “Productivity and City Size: A Critique of the Evidence.”  
Quarterly Journal of Economics 96: 675-688. 
 
Nakamura, Ryohei.  1985.  “Agglomeration Economies in Urban Manufacturing 
Industries: A Case of Japanese Cities.”  Journal of Urban Economics 17: 108-
124. 
 
Ring, Raymond J., Jr.  1999.  “Producers’ and Consumers’ Share of the General Sales 
Tax.”  National Tax Journal 52: 79-90. 
 
Rork, Jonathan C.  2003.  “Coveting Thy Neighbors’ Taxation.”  National Tax Journal 
56: 775-87. 
 
Rosenthal, Stuart S. and William C. Strange.  2003a.  “Geography, Industrial 
Organization and Agglomeration.”  Review of Economics and Statistics 85: 377-
393. 
 
Rosenthal, Stuart S. and William C. Strange.  2003b.  “Evidence on the Nature and 
Sources of Agglomeration Economies.”  Handbook of Regional and Urban 
Economics, J.V. Henderson and J.F. Thisse, eds. 
 
Segal, David.  1976.  “Are There Returns to Scale in City Size?”  Review of Economics 
and Statistics 58: 339-350. 
 
Sveikauskas, Leo.  1975.  “The Productivity of Cities.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 
89: 393-413. 
 
Troske, Kenneth R.  1999.  “Evidence on the Employer Size–Wage Premium from 




Van der Panne, Gerben.  2004.  “Agglomeration Externalities: Marshall versus Jacobs.”  
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 14: 593-604. 
 
Wheeler, Christopher H.  2006.  “Productivity and the Geographic Concentration of 
Industry: The Role of Plant Scale.”  Regional Science and Urban Economics 36: 
313-330. 
 
Wilson, John.  1999.  “Theories of Tax Competition.”  National Tax Journal 52: 269-
304. 
 
Wilson, John.  1986.  “A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition.”  Journal of Urban 
Economics 19: 296-315. 
 
Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszkowski.  1986.  “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, 
































































































Table 1.1: Variable Description and Source Notes
Variable Name Description Source
Local Option Sales Tax Rate County's local option sales tax rate TN Dept of Revenue
Avg Neighbors' Sales Tax Rate Average of neighbors' local option sales tax rates Author's Calculations
Effective Property Tax Rate Effective county property tax rate on real commerical and industrial property Comptroller of TN
Avg Neighbors' Effective Property Tax Rate Average of neighbors' effective property tax rates Author's Calculations
Mfg Specialization Proportion of county's total employment in the manufacturing sector Bureau of Economic Analysis
divided by that of the United States
Retail Specialization Proportion of county's total employment in the retail sector Bureau of Economic Analysis
divided by that of the United States
Service Specialization Proportion of county's total employment in the service sector Bureau of Economic Analysis
divided by that of the United States
Industry Diversity Sum of the manufacturing, retail and service shares of Bureau of Economic Analysis
total county employment squared 
Mfg Jobs Total number of county jobs in the manufacturing sector Bureau of Economic Analysis
Retail Jobs Total number of county jobs in the retail sector Bureau of Economic Analysis
Service Jobs Total number of county jobs in the service sector Bureau of Economic Analysis
Average Weekly Wage Average weekly wage of all workers in the county ($) Bureau of Labor Statistics
Population Population of the county U.S. Census Bureau
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) County's per capita income scaled by 1000 Bureau of Economic Analysis
County Unemployment Rate County's unemployment rate U.S. Census Bureau
% of Population Aged 5-17 Percent of county's population between the ages of 5 and 17 U.S. Census Bureau
% of Population Aged 65+ Percent of county's population over the age of 65 U.S. Census Bureau




Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max
Local Option Sales Tax Rate 2.17 0.32 1.00 2.75 2.41 0.30 1.50 2.75
Avg Neighbors' Sales Tax Rate 2.18 0.16 1.85 2.50 2.42 0.17 2.00 2.75
Effective Property Tax Rate 1.09 0.27 0.38 2.42 0.91 0.20 0.29 1.56
Avg Neighbors' Effective Property Tax Rate 1.08 0.13 0.79 1.46 0.91 0.12 0.63 1.21
Mfg Specialization 1.69 0.53 0.52 3.06 1.56 0.70 0.38 3.17
Retail Specialization 0.82 0.24 0.29 1.81 0.98 0.18 0.54 1.66
Service Specialization 0.55 0.16 0.23 1.02 0.50 0.23 0.02 1.12
Industry Diversity 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.27
Mfg Jobs 5697.43 8263.52 370.00 51396.00 4480.93 6400.32 105.00 40137.00
Retail Jobs 5128.66 13020.26 99.00 91397.00 4212.40 9825.88 150.00 67739.00
Service Jobs 8199.82 23999.67 150.00 156934.00 12489.44 38102.91 16.00 252336.00
Average Weekly Wage 366.27 66.46 262.46 584.63 529.51 91.99 360.00 777.00
Population 53533.33 108429.70 4533.00 846395.00 61024.09 117633.70 4999.00 905678.00
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) 16.20 2.93 10.38 28.74 23.33 4.46 14.61 42.69
County Unemployment Rate 7.31 2.53 2.90 14.90 6.59 1.62 3.40 10.60
% of Population Aged 5-17 18.24 1.42 15.62 21.96 16.92 1.37 12.25 20.69
% of Population Aged 65+ 14.22 2.36 7.53 19.52 13.95 2.42 7.69 22.06
Per Capita Govt Expenditures 897.20 277.02 379.20 2922.90 1531.40 371.41 588.70 2818.70






Table 1.3: 3SLS Results with 4 weight specifications
Prop Sales Prop Sales Prop Sales Prop Sales
Avg of Neighbors' Rates 0.255 0.616** 0.205 0.205 0.559*** 0.263 0.218 0.621**
(0.219) (0.271) (0.137) (0.222) (0.206) (0.167) (0.219) (0.270)
Mfg Specialization (t-1) 0.046*** -0.037 0.045*** -0.064*** 0.054*** -0.057** 0.047*** -0.037
(0.017) (0.025) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.025)
Retail Specialization (t-1) 0.020 -0.032 0.020 -0.018 0.014 -0.023 0.021 -0.032
(0.038) (0.049) (0.038) (0.049) (0.039) (0.050) (0.038) (0.049)
Service Specialization (t-1) 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.022 -0.003 0.016 0.018 0.017
(0.046) (0.059) (0.046) (0.060) (0.048) (0.061) (0.046) (0.059)
Industry Diversity 0.271 -0.134 0.248 -0.404 0.192 -0.344 0.272 -0.127
(0.187) (0.286) (0.189) (0.260) (0.194) (0.265) (0.187) (0.287)
Population 0.004*** -0.001 0.004*** -0.002 0.004*** -0.002 0.004*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Average Weekly Wage 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) -0.010* 0.012* -0.010** 0.010 -0.012** 0.010 -0.010* 0.012**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
County Unemployment Rate 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
% of Population Aged 5-17 0.043*** -0.025** 0.047*** -0.019* 0.035*** -0.023** 0.043*** -0.025**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010)
% of Population Aged 65+ -0.018* 0.004 -0.020** -0.008 -0.012 -0.004 -0.019** 0.004
(0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Per Capita Government Expenditures (t-1) 0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.250 1.117 2.584** 2.406*** 2.344** 2.228*** -0.210 1.102
(0.336) (0.837) (1.025) (0.604) (0.999) (0.526) (0.335) (0.833)
R-squared 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.83 0.87 0.84 0.87
N=950 for all regressions
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
County and year fixed effects as well as MSA and border dummies are included in all estimations
Spatially weighted explanatory variables are used as instruments for the sales and property tax rate equations
Weight matrices are defined in the text
Pop-Contig Weights Inc-Contig WeightsContiguity Weights JDiv-Contig Weights
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Table 1.4: 3SLS Robustness Results with 4 weight specifications
Prop Sales Prop Sales Prop Sales Prop Sales
Avg of Neighbors' Rates 0.483** 0.659** 0.410*** 0.141 0.604*** 0.246 0.454* 0.665**
(0.235) (0.267) (0.156) (0.230) (0.205) (0.169) (0.233) (0.265)
Mfg Jobs (t-1) -0.014** 0.012* -0.014** 0.009 -0.009 0.012 -0.014** 0.012
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Retail Jobs (t-1) 0.004* -0.000 0.005** 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 -0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Service Jobs (t-1) 0.003*** 0.002* 0.004*** 0.003* 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Industry Diversity 0.252 -0.230 0.179 -0.628** 0.172 -0.549** 0.259 -0.225
(0.180) (0.296) (0.186) (0.257) (0.186) (0.257) (0.179) (0.296)
Population 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004* 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Average Weekly Wage 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.001* 0.001** -0.001* 0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) -0.015*** 0.010* -0.015*** 0.009 -0.015*** 0.008 -0.014*** 0.010*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
County Unemployment Rate -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
% of Population Aged 5-17 0.040*** -0.026** 0.048*** -0.020* 0.034*** -0.024** 0.040*** -0.025**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010)
% of Population Aged 65+ -0.013 0.009 -0.016* -0.002 -0.012 0.001 -0.014 0.009
(0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Per Capita Government Expenditures (t-1) 0.000** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.163 0.933 -0.057 2.534*** 0.000 2.412*** -0.136 0.916
(0.327) (0.844) (0.274) (0.632) (0.000) (0.595) (0.326) (0.838)
R-squared 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.83 0.87 0.84 0.87
N=950 for all regressions
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
County and year fixed effects as well as MSA and border dummies are included in all estimations
Spatially weighted explanatory variables are used as instruments for the sales and property tax rate equations
Weight matrices are defined in the text
Pop-Contig Weights Inc-Contig WeightsContiguity Weights JDiv-Contig Weights
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Table 1.5: SUR Yardstick Results with 4 weight specifications
Prop Sales Prop Sales Prop Sales Prop Sales
Avg of Neighbors' Rates (t-1) 0.087 0.510*** 0.111** 0.691*** 0.153*** 0.241*** 0.087 0.507***
(0.063) (0.042) (0.045) (0.048) (0.052) (0.032) (0.063) (0.042)
Tax Base (t-1) 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mfg Specialization (t-1) 0.059*** -0.043** 0.058*** -0.053** 0.063*** -0.059*** 0.059*** -0.044**
(0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.021)
Retail Specialization (t-1) 0.034 -0.038 0.032 -0.019 0.035 -0.034 0.034 -0.037
(0.036) (0.048) (0.036) (0.047) (0.036) (0.050) (0.036) (0.048)
Service Specialization (t-1) 0.005 0.037 0.002 0.021 0.002 0.022 0.005 0.036
(0.044) (0.058) (0.044) (0.057) (0.044) (0.061) (0.044) (0.058)
Industry Diversity 0.115 -0.153 0.107 -0.123 0.083 -0.310 0.115 -0.151
(0.182) (0.240) (0.182) (0.234) (0.182) (0.250) (0.182) (0.240)
Population -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Average Weekly Wage 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) -0.012*** 0.014** -0.013*** 0.011* -0.013*** 0.011* -0.012*** 0.015**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
County Unemployment Rate 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
% of Population Aged 5-17 0.043*** -0.023** 0.045*** -0.027*** 0.041*** -0.022** 0.043*** -0.023**
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
% of Population Aged 65+ -0.017** -0.001 -0.017** -0.007 -0.016** -0.005 -0.017** -0.001
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Per Capita Government Expenditures (t-1) 0.000* -0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R-squared 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.88
N=855 for all regressions
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
County and year fixed effects as well as MSA and border dummies are included in all estimations
Spatially weighted explanatory variables are used as instruments for the sales and property tax rate equations
Weight matrices are defined in the text
Pop-Contig Weights Inc-Contig WeightsContiguity Weights JDiv-Contig Weights
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Appendix Table 1.1: OLS Results
Prop Sales Prop Sales Prop Sales Prop Sales
Avg of Neighbors' Rates 0.0726 0.4724*** 0.0369 0.5330*** 0.1559*** 0.2246*** 0.0798 0.4721***
(0.0675) (0.0415) (0.0473) (0.0467) (0.0546) (0.0316) (0.0679) (0.0415)
Mfg Specialization (t-1) 0.0285* -0.0379* 0.0289* -0.0517** 0.0314* -0.0463** 0.0287* -0.0382*
(0.0168) (0.0209) (0.0168) (0.0209) (0.0168) (0.0217) (0.0168) (0.0209)
Retail Specialization (t-1) -0.0377 0.0260 -0.0360 0.0351 -0.0387 0.0428 -0.0377 0.0267
(0.0365) (0.0450) (0.0365) (0.0452) (0.0363) (0.0466) (0.0365) (0.0450)
Service Specialization (t-1) 0.0329 0.0224 0.0339 0.0138 0.0281 0.0203 0.0328 0.0219
(0.0466) (0.0587) (0.0466) (0.0586) (0.0465) (0.0610) (0.0466) (0.0587)
Industry Diversity 0.4434** -0.1596 0.4378** -0.1805 0.4184** -0.3180 0.4433** -0.1571
(0.1880) (0.2394) (0.1882) (0.2389) (0.1875) (0.2483) (0.1880) (0.2394)
Population 0.0005*** -0.0000 0.0005*** -0.0001 0.0005*** -0.0002 0.0005*** -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Average Weekly Wage 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) -0.0052 0.0080 -0.0050 0.0055 -0.0057 0.0062 -0.0052 0.0080
(0.0042) (0.0052) (0.0042) (0.0052) (0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0042) (0.0052)
County Unemployment Rate 0.0026 -0.0053* 0.0025 -0.0067** 0.0025 -0.0049 0.0026 -0.0053*
(0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0031)
% of Population Aged 5-17 0.0392*** -0.0150* 0.0401*** -0.0166* 0.0372*** -0.0146 0.0391*** -0.0150*
(0.0070) (0.0089) (0.0070) (0.0090) (0.0071) (0.0092) (0.0070) (0.0089)
% of Population Aged 65+ -0.0175*** -0.0120 -0.0180*** -0.0190** -0.0160** -0.0133* -0.0174*** -0.0120
(0.0064) (0.0075) (0.0064) (0.0076) (0.0064) (0.0077) (0.0064) (0.0075)
Per Capita Government Expenditures (t-1) 0.0000** -0.0000 0.0000** -0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.2416 1.4762*** 0.2595 1.5370*** 0.1900 2.1048*** 0.2354 1.4746***
(0.2061) (0.2632) (0.2039) (0.2635) (0.2011) (0.2617) (0.2061) (0.2633)
R-squared 0.21 0.54 0.20 0.50 0.22 0.52 0.21 0.54
N=950 for all regressions
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
County and year fixed effects as well as MSA and border dummies are included in all estimations
Weight matrices are defined in the text
Pop-Contig Weights Inc-Contig WeightsContiguity Weights JDiv-Contig Weights
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Appendix Table 1.2: IV Random Effects Results
Prop Sales Prop Sales Prop Sales Prop Sales
Avg of Neighbors' Rates -0.0147 0.5874*** 0.0782 0.4052 0.5048** 0.1248 -0.0266 0.5712***
(0.2397) (0.1811) (0.1391) (0.2665) (0.2361) (0.2582) (0.2431) (0.1832)
Mfg Specialization (t-1) 0.0290* -0.0369* 0.0292* -0.0510** 0.0380** -0.0482** 0.0289* -0.0376*
(0.0168) (0.0219) (0.0168) (0.0211) (0.0177) (0.0220) (0.0169) (0.0218)
Retail Specialization (t-1) -0.0356 0.0032 -0.0350 0.0378 -0.0423 0.0397 -0.0355 0.0070
(0.0366) (0.0470) (0.0366) (0.0456) (0.0371) (0.0480) (0.0366) (0.0468)
Service Specialization (t-1) 0.0346 0.0209 0.0334 0.0150 0.0144 0.0200 0.0348 0.0204
(0.0469) (0.0588) (0.0466) (0.0588) (0.0484) (0.0612) (0.0469) (0.0587)
Industry Diversity 0.4464** -0.1155 0.4288** -0.2600 0.3572* -0.4174 0.4468** -0.1196
(0.1881) (0.2740) (0.1903) (0.2919) (0.1960) (0.3278) (0.1881) (0.2750)
Population 0.0005** -0.0001 0.0005*** -0.0002 0.0005*** -0.0002 0.0005** -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Average Weekly Wage 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0003* -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) -0.0044 0.0095* -0.0055 0.0054 -0.0082* 0.0061 -0.0043 0.0093*
(0.0047) (0.0055) (0.0045) (0.0052) (0.0046) (0.0055) (0.0047) (0.0054)
County Unemployment Rate 0.0026 -0.0052* 0.0025 -0.0060* 0.0024 -0.0043 0.0026 -0.0051*
(0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0024) (0.0031)
% of Population Aged 5-17 0.0405*** -0.0178** 0.0400*** -0.0158* 0.0308*** -0.0150 0.0406*** -0.0172*
(0.0075) (0.0090) (0.0070) (0.0087) (0.0082) (0.0092) (0.0075) (0.0089)
% of Population Aged 65+ -0.0190** -0.0084 -0.0172** -0.0179** -0.0100 -0.0136* -0.0192** -0.0090
(0.0076) (0.0084) (0.0069) (0.0080) (0.0076) (0.0081) (0.0076) (0.0083)
Per Capita Government Expenditures (t-1) 0.0000** -0.0000 0.0000** -0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.3044 1.2230** 0.2165 1.8036*** -0.0537 2.3688*** 0.3136 1.2560**
(0.2847) (0.5326) (0.2416) (0.6145) (0.2639) (0.6679) (0.2862) (0.5353)
R-squared 0.20 0.53 0.20 0.51 0.21 0.51 0.20 0.53
N=950 for all regressions
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
County and year fixed effects as well as MSA and border dummies are included in all estimations
Spatially weighted explanatory variables are used as instruments for the sales and property tax rate equations
Weight matrices are defined in the text
Contiguity Weights Pop-Contig Weights Inc-Contig Weights JDiv-Contig Weights
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Appendix Table 1.3: SUR Results with 4 weight specifications
Prop Sales Prop Sales Prop Sales Prop Sales
Avg of Neighbors' Rates (t-1) 0.023 0.510*** 0.042 0.691*** 0.113** 0.241*** 0.027 0.507***
(0.064) (0.042) (0.046) (0.048) (0.054) (0.032) (0.065) (0.042)
Mfg Specialization (t-1) 0.047*** -0.043** 0.046*** -0.053** 0.050*** -0.059*** 0.047*** -0.044**
(0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.021)
Retail Specialization (t-1) 0.023 -0.038 0.022 -0.019 0.024 -0.034 0.023 -0.037
(0.037) (0.048) (0.037) (0.047) (0.037) (0.050) (0.037) (0.048)
Service Specialization (t-1) 0.024 0.036 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.022 0.024 0.035
(0.045) (0.058) (0.045) (0.057) (0.045) (0.061) (0.045) (0.058)
Industry Diversity 0.278 -0.152 0.276 -0.119 0.254 -0.311 0.277 -0.150
(0.186) (0.239) (0.186) (0.233) (0.186) (0.249) (0.186) (0.239)
Population 0.004*** -0.002 0.004*** -0.000 0.004*** -0.002 0.004*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Average Weekly Wage 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) -0.007 0.014** -0.008* 0.011* -0.008* 0.011* -0.007 0.014**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
County Unemployment Rate 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
% of Population Aged 5-17 0.045*** -0.023** 0.046*** -0.027*** 0.043*** -0.022** 0.045*** -0.023**
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
% of Population Aged 65+ -0.023*** -0.001 -0.023*** -0.007 -0.021*** -0.005 -0.023*** -0.001
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Per Capita Government Expenditures (t-1) 0.000* -0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R-squared 0.84 0.88 0.84 0.88 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.88
N=855 for all regressions
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
County and year fixed effects as well as MSA and border dummies are included in all estimations
Spatially weighted explanatory variables are used as instruments for the sales and property tax rate equations
Weight matrices are defined in the text






















Part 3:  Essay 2:  Interactions Between Migration and State Tax Rates: An 
Empirical Investigation 
57 
This Subcommittee's original premise that Maine’s comparatively high individual income 
tax rates would act as a considerable barrier to attracting or retaining retirees was refuted 
by data provided by a variety of sources.  That does not mean that Maine’s individual 
income tax code is competitive with so-called retiree magnet states.  Clearly, there 
are reasons other than Maine’s tax policy which allow Maine to attract a net gain in 
the number of retirees moving into the state. 
 “A Golden Opportunity II: How Maine Can Enhance the Retirement Industry,”   




State policymakers have long been concerned with the potential for their state’s 
tax policy to drive away residents and prevent non-residents from relocating to the state.  
These fears potentially play a large role in the tax rate choices made by state 
policymakers.  In addition, if states are competing to attract and maintain individuals by 
choosing tax rates that are attractive, a state must consider another state’s tax rates before 
choosing its own in order to ensure its tax rates are competitive.  The result of the 
competition might be the familiar “race to the bottom.”  While the majority of the “race 
to the bottom” predictions are specifically concerned with capital tax competition, the 
competition over states to attract individuals into the state provides a parallel analysis. 
Empirical investigations of a race to the bottom in capital taxes generally build 
upon the capital tax competition proposition that capital tax rates are negatively 
correlated with the degree of capital mobility.  The empirical analysis pursued here 
begins from a similar idea.  If individuals are able to move freely between states, states 
may expect to set tax rates lower with increased mobility of individuals.  While 
individuals are free to choose locations in most developed economies and therefore may 
move in response to tax rates, there are certainly costs involved in any relocation 
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decision.29  These involve not only pecuniary costs, such as transportation expenses, but 
also non-pecuniary costs, such as the psychological cost of leaving friends and family or 
leaving a preferred geography such as a beach or mountains. 
Recent theoretical models have investigated the role that these non-pecuniary 
costs have on subnational personal income tax rates.  If these non-pecuniary costs are 
sufficiently large, the race to the bottom in personal taxes may be altered.  For example, 
residents of a state that is attractive for climate reasons may be less likely to leave the 
state, thus the relative attractiveness of the state increases the costs of moving away.  
Similarly the attractive state is in a better position to draw non-residents.  This has the 
effect of lowering the cost of leaving the current location for the attractive state.  The 
dual impact of being costly to leave and relatively inexpensive to enter the state provides 
some monopoly power to the state.  As a result, an attractive state does not feel the same 
pressure as an unattractive state in setting its tax policy to attract and maintain residents.  
Thus the attractive state is able to maintain a higher tax rate than the unattractive state.  
This monopoly power also allows the state to pay less attention to other states’ tax rates. 
While much of the theoretical literature has hypothesized that the mobility of the 
tax base is important to the rate that is set, the vast majority of the empirical work has not 
explicitly measured the mobility of the tax base but has instead examined the effects of 
mobility by testing for strategic interactions between government.  Specifically, many 
studies have regressed a state’s tax rate on the tax rate of neighboring states.  While these 
                                                          
29 The US Supreme Court has interpreted the US Constitution in numerous cases as allowing for citizens of 
the US to enter or leave a state without limitations.  In addition, the US Supreme Court has ruled that states 
must treat residents equally, regardless of the length of residence in the state.  For example, California 
recently drafted legislation (later overturned by the Supreme Court) requiring that welfare benefits of 
families who had resided in California for less than one year be no higher than the benefits received in the 
prior state of residence. 
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empirical models do not directly measure tax base mobility, the results generally indicate 
that states do not set tax rates in isolation.30
While these findings indicate that governments behave strategically, the mobility 
of the tax base is not the only underlying behavior that may lead to the relationship.  The 
interaction may be the result of yardstick competition, where voters decide whether or not 
to vote for a politician based on their state’s tax rates compared with other states’ rates.  
Thus, politicians may consider other states’ tax rates when setting their own rate. 
A similar body of literature investigates whether the relaxation of capital controls 
has had a significant effect on the ability to impose capital taxes (Slemrod (2004), 
Bretschger and Hettich (2002) and Rodrik (1997)).  The findings in the literature are 
mixed with recent empirical studies concluding that decreasing the constraints to capital 
flows leads to lower capital taxes.  One drawback to this literature is that the models do 
not allow for strategic interaction, so this literature cannot address whether changes in 
mobility affect the intensity of the competition in addition to its effects on the level of tax 
rates.  In addition, no direct measure of mobility is available so the measures used in the 
studies may not be the best measures of the mobility described in the theoretical models.  
The research presented here sets out to empirically investigate the relationship 
between the monopoly power of the state and the tax rates of the state, while also 
informing the literature on how the monopoly power of the state affects the strategic 
interaction.  The monopoly power of the state is derived from its unique attributes and 
amenities, which provides it the ability to maintain residents and attract non-residents 
relatively easily.  Thus, the first hypothesis of this research is that a state with higher net 
                                                          
30 See Brueckner (2003) for a survey of empirical tax competition research. 
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in-migration will have the ability to maintain higher tax rates on individuals without 
fearing the race to the bottom as much as a less attractive state.  The second hypothesis of 
this study is that an attractive state will interact differently with other states if the 
interaction is a reflection of tax base mobility. 
Results using a panel of state data from 1993-2004 confirm both hypotheses.  
Controlling for the simultaneous nature of the migration response and the tax rate 
decision, a positive relationship is found between the net in-migration of a state and the 
state personal income tax rate and the total state tax burden, indicating that a more 
attractive state is able to impose higher tax rates on its residents.  The second hypothesis 
is also confirmed.  Using an interaction term between the neighbor’s tax rate and the net 
in-migration of a state, it is found that the coefficient estimate on the neighbor’s personal 
income tax rate variable is positive when the state has higher net in-migration as opposed 
to negative for an average or lower net migration state indicating a different type of 
strategic interaction. 
 The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2.B provides an overview of relevant 
literature.  Section 2.C presents a brief theoretical model.  Section 2.D details the 
empirical strategy and data that will be implemented.  Section 2.E presents results 
followed by conclusions in section 2.F. 
2.B Relevant Literature 
Mobility and Subnational Fiscal Policies 
Research has long considered the impact that capital and labor mobility has on 
government policies.  In an early study Tiebout (1956) examined how the mobility of 
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individuals affects the setting of local government fiscal policies.  In Tiebout’s model 
individuals are free to choose where to locate and will continue to costlessly move until 
finding the location with the individual’s optimal bundle of public services and taxes.  
This freedom to choose where to locate, as well as create new jurisdictions, leads to an 
efficient set of local fiscal policies as measured by the willingness of individuals to 
remain in the jurisdiction.  Fischel (1975) extended Tiebout’s model by substituting firms 
as the mobile factor and continues to find that mobility leads to the efficient bundle of 
public services and taxes. 
One assumption of Tiebout’s original model that has been routinely investigated 
is the assumption that government policies generate zero interregional externalities.  
Recent theoretical models of tax competition incorporated the role of interregional 
externalities and found that government taxes and subsequent spending are set at an 
inefficiently low level.31  The tax and spending bundle is set inefficiently low if 
governments ignore the fiscal externality that exists due to the mobility of factors.  For 
example, an increase in a tax on individuals may lead these individuals to flee to another 
jurisdiction.  To maintain the population, the government may keep the rate low, and in 
doing so harms the other jurisdiction that would have benefited from the arrival of the 
population and the subsequent increase in the tax base.32
While much of the theoretical literature has hypothesized that the mobility of the 
tax base is important to the rate that is set, the vast majority of the empirical work has not 
                                                          
31 See Wilson (1999) for a review of the literature. 
32 Brennan and Buchanan (1980) reach a conclusion similar to the tax competition literature regarding the 
role of mobility on the size of government, but their model does not indicate that welfare is reduced 
because of the mobility of factors.  They hypothesize that without the mobility of factors, the revenue 
maximizing government would impose fiscal policies that maximize revenue but are larger than required to 
maximize welfare of individuals. 
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explicitly measured the mobility of the tax base but has instead examined strategic 
interactions between governments.  Studies of strategic interaction between government 
vary across levels of government and tax rates.  Rork (2003) looks at strategic interaction 
between states in setting excise tax rates, general sales tax rates and personal and 
corporate income tax rates.  He finds coefficient estimates on the neighbor’s tax rates 
ranging from –0.24 to 0.64 depending on the tax rate.  Esteller-More and Sole-Olle 
(2002) study strategic personal income tax setting between Canadian provinces and find 
that provinces behave as strategic complements; that is, an increase in a neighboring 
province’s rate is positively correlated with the own province’s personal income tax rate. 
Other studies have looked at strategic interaction between local governments.  
Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) examine strategic property tax rate setting among 
municipal governments in the Boston metro area and find that the reaction function is 
upward sloping.  Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998) also find evidence of strategic income 
and property tax competition among Belgian municipalities. 
One drawback to these studies is that none allow mobility to play an explicit role 
in the empirical models.  The finding that a government’s tax rate is a function of 
neighboring governments’ tax rates may be the result of two underlying behaviors.  One 
is that governments are competing for the mobile tax base by setting tax rates 
competitively with other jurisdictions in an attempt to attract and maintain tax base. 
Yardstick competition pressures are another possible explanation for the 
correlation between governments’ tax rates.  Besley and Case (1995) propose a model of 
tax setting in the presence of multiple jurisdictions, where asymmetric information 
regarding the politicians’ decisions exists between voters and politicians.  As a result, 
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voters make decisions about politicians’ abilities to set taxes and expenditures in a 
relative way; that is, a politician’s performance is measured relative to the performance of 
politicians in other jurisdictions.  In this world, a voter may not mind that her taxes are 
rising if voters from other jurisdictions are experiencing similar tax increases.  Because 
voters decide whether or not to vote for an incumbent based on their jurisdiction’s taxes 
compared with other jurisdictions’, incumbents may consider other jurisdictions’ tax rates 
before setting their own tax rate.  Following Brueckner (2003), the behavioral models 
lead to an identical empirical specification, which does not allow the researcher to 
attribute evidence of strategic interaction to a certain behavior. 
A small body of literature has sought to get closer to the mobility issue by 
investigating how decreased capital mobility restrictions affect capital tax rates.  All of 
the studies assume that decreasing restrictions on international capital flows are proxies 
for increased capital mobility; therefore fewer trade restrictions are expected to lead to 
declines in capital tax rates.  One method that studies have pursued to proxy this 
openness is the amount of trade flows in and out of a country.  Rodrik (1997) uses a panel 
of OECD countries and finds that increased trade openness (measured as imports plus 
exports as a percentage of GDP) is associated with reductions in tax rates on capital.  
Bretschger and Hettich (2002) also regress effective corporate income tax rates on the 
same measure of trade openness as well as an index of openness.33  They find that 
integration in the global economy has a negative impact on corporate taxes. 
                                                          
33 The openness index is from Quinn (1997).  It is a qualitative index, ranging from 0 (most closed) to 14 
(most open).  It is constructed by analyzing restrictions on both capital inflows and outflows and by 
incorporating international agreements that impose constraints on capital flows. 
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Slemrod (2004) regresses statutory and average corporate income tax rates on the 
same measure of trade openness (imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP) as well as 
a qualitative measure of policy openness derived in Sachs and Warner (1995).  He finds 
that increased measures of trade openness are associated with lower statutory corporate 
income tax rates.  A potential weakness of these studies is that the literature does not 
allow for strategic interaction between governments to occur.  Also, given that there are 
no direct measures of mobility, the measures used in these studies may not accurately 
proxy the mobility constraints faced by governments in setting tax rates. 
The two bodies of literature described above provide two important findings.  
First, the evidence is compelling that governments behave strategically.  However, 
because of the empirical specification of the majority of these models, the strategic 
interaction cannot necessarily be attributed to greater mobility of the tax base.  Instead, 
yardstick competition may be the behavior driving the interaction.  Therefore, the models 
cannot explicitly derive a relationship between the mobility of the factor and the tax rate.  
The second important finding from the other body of literature is that tax rates are 
generally found to be lower in the presence of greater tax base mobility.  As discussed 
above, one potential weakness of these studies is that the models do not allow for 
strategic interaction between governments.  This empirical investigation seeks to remedy 
these shortcomings by allowing strategic interaction and the mobility of the tax base to 
affect a state’s tax rate.  This is accomplished by specifying a state’s tax rate as a function 
of its neighbors’ tax rates as well as the net migration rate of the state, which is used as a 
proxy for the mobility of the tax base. 
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2.C Theoretical Background 
To motivate the empirical analysis of the role that attractiveness and neighbors’ 
tax rates have in the setting of a state’s tax rate, consider the following model.34  Imagine 
a simple economy with two states, the East and the West, indexed by E and W, 
respectively.  Residents of each state are assumed to be freely mobile between the two, 
but not necessarily perfectly (or costlessly) mobile since certain states are more attractive 
because of family or friend ties to the area or a geographic/climate preference for the 
area.  To calculate its optimal tax policy, the state first estimates the equilibrium 
migration response of a change in the tax rate for individuals in or out of the state.  The 
state then chooses its optimal tax policy by maximizing an objective function discussed 
below, taking the other states’ tax policies as given and accurately predicting the 
migration responses. 
The economy consists of n individuals who differ only in their preferences for 
each state.  It is assumed there is an individual of each preference type, denoted by x, 
where x is uniformly distributed from 0 to1.  The utility function of an individual is 
additionally comprised of consumption of a private good (c) and a public good (g).  
Following Wellisch (1994) and Mansoorian and Myers (1993), the utility function of 
individuals is additively separable in the preference for the location.  As a result, the 
utility function of individual x is given by 
















                                                          
34 The model described here borrows from Hindriks (1999 and 2001) and Wellisch (1994). 
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All residents in the East have the same sub-utility given by UE with differences 
arising from differences in preferences for the state.  The taste parameter x measures the 
benefit from living in the West and (1-x) is the benefit of living in the East.  Therefore, 
residents with relatively small x prefer to live in the East, and those with relatively large x 
prefer to live in the West.  The parameter a > 0 measures the intensity of the individual’s 
preferences for (or the allure of) the East, with a = 0 representing no preference and thus 
perfect mobility. 
Individuals face no restrictions in choosing their state of residence although 
behavior is influenced by state-specific preferences.  Following Hindriks (1999 and 
2001), it can be shown using the utility functions that for each pair  there exists an 
 such that all individuals with preferences 
),( WE tt
),( WEE ttx ),( WEE ttxx ≤  locate in the East and 
all others in the West.  Because x is uniformly distributed, it follows that  is the 
percent of the n individuals that live in the East.  Because individuals differ in their 
preferences for a state, the migration equilibrium is characterized by the marginal 
individual being indifferent between the states, which is given by the parameter .  The 
migration equilibrium is given by 
),( WEE ttx
Ex
 EWWWEEEE axgcUxagcU +=−+ ),()1(),( .   (1) 
 Solving equation (1) for , it can be shown that the migration responses of an 
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The most interesting aspect of the response for this research is the result that the 
migration decision of the individual in response to a change in the tax rate depends on the 
attractiveness of the East.  If equation (2) is negative, which is expected because a higher 
tax rate increases the cost of living in the state, the negative reaction can be shown to be 







 can be shown to be a function 
of the attractiveness of the East.  If this response is positive, as expected, the positive 
reaction can be shown to be decreasing in the attractiveness of the East as well.  The key 
result is that the attraction of the East enables the state to continue to maintain and attract 
some individuals, even with an increase in its tax rate, providing some monopoly power 
to the attractive state’s government. 
 Now that the state can accurately predict the equilibrium migration response of 
individuals, the jurisdiction must set the optimal fiscal policies taking the other 
jurisdiction’s policies as given.  Consider a setting where the government attempts to 
maximize revenue.35  As in Kanbur and Keen (1993), the revenue maximization 
objective function may be interpreted as a welfare maximization problem when 
individuals place high marginal valuation on consumption of a public good relative to a 
private good.  The maximization problem of the government is given by 
        (3) ),(max WEEEEt ttnxytE
                                                          
35 Hindriks’ (1999) theoretical model assumes that the government sets out to maximize the income of the 
residents, as opposed to the utility of the individual.  His results also hold when the jurisdiction sets the 
optimal policies according to majority rule voting (see Hindriks (2001)).  These models rely on some 
assumptions regarding information about the migrating individuals.  Specifically, assumptions must be 
made regarding the fiscal burden of the in-migrating individuals to determine whether the inflow of the 
individuals provides benefits to the current residents. 
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where t is a proportional income tax.36  The term  measures the number of 
individuals in the East, so  gives the total income in the East. 
),( WEE ttnx
),( WEEE ttnxy
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By plugging equation (2) into (4) it is seen that the equilibrium tax rate of the East, taking 
the West’s tax rate as given and accurately forecasting the migration response, as shown 
above in equation (2), is a function of the attraction of the East (a), the income of the 
individuals in the East (y) and the number of individuals in the East (nx) among other 
variables. 
 As discussed above, the allure of the state allows the state to maintain some 
individuals even with a higher tax rate than an unattractive state and some individuals 
continue to enter the state even with the relatively higher tax rate.  As a result, the more 
attractive state, whether due to family/friend ties to the area or geographic/climate 
preferences for the area, will experience more in-migration and less out-migration, 
holding all else constant.  For this reason, the equilibrium tax rate of the tax rate is 
expected to be higher in a more attractive state, revealed through higher net in-migration 
(in-migration minus out-migration) to the state. 
 Following the tax competition literature, the derivative of equation (4) with 
respect to  yields the reaction function Wt
                                                          



















.    (5) 
As seen in the prior literature (Goodspeed (2002) and Besley and Rosen (1997)), the sign 
of the reaction function with respect to the neighbor’s tax rate can be positive, negative or 
zero.  Of particular interest to this research, equation (5) reduces to zero if the population 
does not migrate in response to the tax rate. 
 The theoretical model presented above indicates that the taxes of a state are the 
function of how good the state is at maintaining residents and attracting non-residents as 
well as the taxes of the neighboring states.  In addition, the theory above reveals that the 
magnitude of the response to the neighbors’ tax rates depends upon the attraction of the 
state.  In other words, the extent of tax competition pressures on a state depends on the 
how attractive the state is, which leads to the following empirical equation: 
 ititjtitjtitit uXtMtMt +++++= βββββ 3210     (6) 
where M represents the net-migration of individuals of the state,  represents the own 
state tax rate,  represents the neighbor’s tax rate and X is vector of control variables as 
suggested by the behavioral model. 
itt
jtt
A high net in-migration state is revealed as having the ability to attract new 
residents and maintain current residents relatively well.  This monopoly power will allow 
the state government to avoid the pressure of pursuing a race to the bottom set of tax 
policies, leading to relatively higher tax rates than a low net migration state.  The 
interaction term  is included as the response to the neighbors’ tax rates is expected 
to differ with different magnitudes of the net migration.  A state that is able to avoid a 
jtit tM
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race to the bottom in taxes on individuals because of the attraction of the state is also less 
likely to feel the pressure from other states’ taxes. 
2.D Empirical Strategy and Data 
 Estimation of the above framework is complicated by the simultaneous nature of 
the model:  tax rates affect net migration, while net migration in turn influences tax rates.  
As a result, simply estimating equation (6) by OLS will lead to biased results if the net 
migration is correlated with the error term as suggested by the theory.  As seen in 
equation (2) from the theoretical model above, the in- and out-migration flows of the 
state are a function of the state’s tax rate.  Thus, the net in-migration will be a function of 
the tax rates leading to the following system of equations: 
 ittiitjtitjtitit ufXtMtMt +++++++= λβββββ 3210   (7) 
 ittiitjtitit fZttM ελαααα ++++++= 210     (8) 
where Z is a vector of control variables that affect the net migration of a state and λ  and f 
are state and year fixed effects, respectively.  Estimation of the system of equation 
requires at least one variable in the net migration equation that significantly affects net 
migration but does not have an independent effect on state tax rates and at least one 
variable in the tax rate equation that significantly affects state tax rates but does not have 
an independent effect on net migration. 
Tax Rate Data 
The theoretical model described above employs a state income tax rate as the tax 
instrument.  It is realistic to believe that individuals migrate in response to other taxes, 
and that the monopoly power of state due to the attachment of individuals can affect more 
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than the state income tax rate.  For this reason, a measure of the total tax burden is used 
as an alternative, calculated as the total state tax revenue divided by the total state 
personal income.37
An additional specification includes a measure of the state’s personal income tax 
burden.  This is chosen for three reasons.  First, the personal income tax, along with the 
sales tax, is a significant portion of revenue raised by many states.38  For this reason, the 
states may be especially concerned with the impacts of the personal income tax on 
migration responses.  As the primary interest of the paper is the effect that the 
attractiveness of the state has on state tax rates, the importance of the state personal 
income tax in state revenue collection also suggests it may be a primary method of 
extracting rent from individuals.  The second reason for considering the personal income 
tax is that it is primarily a state policy tool while the sales tax is more frequently a state 
and local policy tool.39  The final reason is that the personal income tax is a direct levy on 
residents while the sales tax is an indirect tax on residents, tourists and businesses. 
The state’s average personal income tax rate is used here as opposed to the 
statutory marginal income tax rate.  The first reason is, given that some state tax systems 
are progressive, no single rate accounts for the incentives faced by all individuals so the 
average rate captures migration incentives faced by poor as well as rich individuals.40  
The second reason for the average rate is to allow comparison to the majority of 
                                                          
37 The models were also run with the combined state and local tax burden.  Results remain consistent with 
the state tax burden but are omitted for brevity.  Data on state and local government revenue are not 
currently available after 2002, so the analysis with the state and local tax burden is for 1993-2002. 
38 The average amount of state revenue collected by states through personal income and sales taxes were 
roughly 34.1 and 32.7 percent, respectively in 2005 (Federation of Tax Administrators). 
39 According to the U.S. 2002 Census of Governments, local governments in 16 states collected income tax 
revenue while local governments in 35 states collected sales tax revenue. 
40 The evidence that welfare recipients move in response to fiscal policies helps support the use of an 
average personal income tax rate (Gelbach (2004) and McKinnish (2005)). 
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empirical strategic interaction studies on income taxation behavior (Esteller-More and 
Sole-Olle (2002), Rork (2003) and Hayashi and Boadway (1999)).  The average personal 
income tax rate is calculated as the total state personal income tax revenue divided by the 
total state personal income. 
Regressing the state’s personal income tax rate on the net migration of the state 
and the neighbor’s personal income tax rate is complicated by the fact that the average 
personal income tax rate includes many zeros (roughly 15 percent of the panel).  To 
properly estimate such a system, the model is further described by the following system 
of equations: 
ittijtitit fXttM ελαααα ++++++= 2
*
10     (9) 
ittijtitjtitit fZtMtMt μλβββββ +++++++= 3210










0* .       (11) 
Following Nelson and Olsen (1978) and as outlined in Maddala (1983), 
estimation of the above model consists of the following procedure.  First, reduced form 
equations for (9) and (10) are written as 
ititit uXM +Π=
1        (12) 
ititit Xt η+Π=
2*        (13) 
where X includes all exogenous variables in X and Z from (9) and (10).  The reduced 
form equation for migration rates is then estimated by OLS and the reduced form 
equation for income tax rates is estimated by the Tobit method.  From these estimations, 
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predicted values are calculated, giving  and .  Equation (9) is then estimated by 










As described above, one of the primary questions of interest for this study is how 
the attraction of a state influences its tax rates.  It is hypothesized that a more attractive 
state is relatively better at maintaining residents and continuing to attract some non-
residents after a tax increase.  These suggest that the more attractive state will experience 
higher net in-migration, measured as in-migration minus out-migration.  Dating back to 
1993, the U.S. Census Bureau has collected annual net domestic migration numbers and 
net international migration numbers for each state.  Net domestic migration is calculated 
as the difference between the number of domestic individuals that moved into the state 
and the number of individuals who moved out of the state to another state during the time 
period.  The net international migration is the difference between the number of migrants 
to a state from outside the U.S. and the number of migrants from a state to anywhere 
outside the U.S. for the time period.  In addition, total net migration is calculated by 
combining the domestic and international migration numbers. 
For this research, the domestic migration data are used for comparability to other 
studies of interstate migration.42  In addition, it might be expected that larger states 
                                                          
41 In addition to the Tobit method, the Heckman selection model is also used for estimating models with a 
large number of zeros.  The primary difference in the method is that the procedure involves two stages with 
the first stage being a probit estimating the probability that the state has a positive income tax rate.  The 
inverse Mills ratio is then estimated and included as a regressor in an OLS estimation of the positive values 
of the state income tax rate.  While the Heckman two-step procedure may be appropriate for estimation of 
equations (10) and (11), to the author’s knowledge there is no Heckman simultaneous procedure to estimate 
the system of equations. 
42 The estimations presented below are also conducted with the total migration rates.  Coefficient estimates 
are not significantly changed so results are not presented but are available from the author. 
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experience more in and out-migration, so the net migration is calculated as a rate to 
eliminate scale issues and also to remain comparable to other aggregate migration studies 
(Gale and Heath (2000) and Conway and Rork (2006)).  Specifically, the net migration 
rate is calculated as the net in-migration divided by the lag of the population of the state. 
Explanatory Variables. 
In explaining both migration and personal income tax rates, other variables 
besides tax rates and migration rates are certainly important so must be controlled for in 
the estimation as guided by the behavioral models.  Previous empirical literature on 
migration and tax rate setting will help guide the choice of explanatory variables. 
Tax Literature.  In addition to the impact that net migration has on state taxes, the 
behavioral model above, as well as a large body of theoretical and empirical literature, 
indicates that a state’s taxes are correlated with other states’ taxes.43  Before including a 
measure of the other state’s tax rates, assignment of states as competitors must be 
completed.  While the decision of defining a state’s competitors is left to the researcher, 
previous research can help guide the choice. 
The strategic interaction is generally thought to occur because of the movement or 
threat of movement of the base between states.  Studies on determinants of migration 
have long found that distance between locations has a negative impact on the migration 
between locations (Greenwood (1997)).  As a result, geographically closer states might 
be a natural starting point.  Evidence of migration occurring more commonly among 
bordering states is also observed in the data.  For example, the 2000 Census indicates that 
41.5, 43, 41, and 57 percent of out-of-state movers to Alabama, Connecticut, Maryland 
                                                          
43 Differentiating equation (2) with respect to  shows the relationship between jurisdictions’ tax rates. Wt
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and Oregon, respectively, came from bordering states.  Obvious exceptions include 
Florida and California where only 8% and 15% of out-of-state movers came from 
bordering states. 
Once only bordering states are defined as competitors, different weights can be 
placed on the neighbors resulting in several different measures of neighbors.  The first 
and most commonly used in the literature is referred to as a contiguity matrix and is 
simply the average of the bordering states’ tax rates (Rork (2003), Esteller-More and 
Sole-Olle (2002) and Fredriksson, et al. (2004)).  In this specification, all bordering states 
are given equal weight. 
Because states might be more concerned with the behavior of the larger bordering 
states, it might make more sense that a state places more weight on the more populous 
bordering states.  For example, Nevada shares borders with five states but nearly 43 
percent of migrants from bordering states come from California, the most populous 
bordering state.  This specification is called the population-contiguity matrix and is 
commonly found in the literature (Rork (2003) and Fredriksson, et al. (2004)).  It 
continues to define only the states that border a state as neighbors, but the states are given 
different weights based upon the proportion of the state’s population to the entire 
bordering population, so the neighbor’s tax measure becomes a population-weighted 
average of the neighbors’ tax rates. 
The final weighing scheme employed continues to consider only bordering states 
as competitors, but distance between the states’ major cities plays a key role.  As pointed 
out above, it is commonly found that greater distance between states will lead to less 
migration between the states.  In addition, many individuals commonly move from 
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metropolitan area to metropolitan area.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current 
Population Survey in 2003, roughly 45 percent of individuals who moved outside of an 
MSA were individuals who moved from one metro area to another metro area.  For this 
specification, only bordering states continue to be considered as neighbors but more 
weight is applied to states with less distance between the most populous cities.  For 
example, Tennessee would place more weight on Arkansas than North Carolina, as 
Memphis is closer in distance to Little Rock than to Charlotte.  The city-contiguity 
measure is simply a distance-weighted average of the bordering states.44
 Because it is hypothesized that states set tax rates strategically, the tax rate on the 
right hand side of the equation is endogenous, so ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation 
would lead to inconsistent estimates of the parameters.45  The literature commonly uses 
one of two approaches to correct for endogeneity.  The first is an instrumental variables 
(IV) methods which, following Brueckner (2003), involves instrumenting the neighbor’s 
tax rate with weighted explanatory variables.46
A second method in dealing with the endogenous neighbor’s tax measure is by 
assuming a lagged as opposed to a contemporaneous response.  In addition to the 
elimination of endogeneity concerns, the lagged strategic variable allows for the 
potentially realistic possibility that strategic behavior occurs with a time lag if 
                                                          
44 Defining neighbors as only geographic neighbors is not the only method.  For example, Fletcher and 
Murray (2005) and Case, Rosen and Hines (1993) explore the interaction between economic or 
demographic neighbors.  Defining neighbors by geography exclusively is the only way to choose a clearly 
exogenous neighbor definition, so pursuit of additional neighbor definitions is left for future research. 
45 See Brueckner (2003) for a review of econometric concerns in estimating strategic interaction models. 
46 For examples of the IV method, see Rork (2003), Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2002) and Fredriksson, et 
al. (2004).  In addition to correcting for the endogeneity, the IV method leads to consistent estimates in the 
presence of spatial error dependence (Kelejian and Prucha (1998)), which may induce correlation in the tax 
rates even though strategic interaction may not be present. 
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governments cannot immediately adjust their own tax policies.47  Because the primary 
interest in this research is the effect of net migration on state taxes and there is evidence 
of lagged strategic interaction (see sources in footnote 45), the analysis here assumes that 
strategic interaction occurs with a one-year time lag. 
It is also important to control for other variables influencing the setting of the 
state taxes.  Following Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2002) and Rork (2003), the fiscal 
stress or economic resources available are potentially important determinants of the rate 
set by a state.  A state with a high per capita outstanding debt might be forced to raise 
revenue by setting higher taxes (Rork (2003)).  In addition, per capita federal transfers 
received by the state may allow the state government to collect fewer revenues due to the 
revenue from the transfer (Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2002)). 
Per capita income is also included to control for resources available to finance 
public services.  As pointed out in Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2002), if public goods 
are normal goods it might be expected that higher income states would desire more public 
goods and therefore accept a higher tax burden.  On the other hand, a richer population 
translates to a larger base, which allows for lower tax rates. 
The next set of control variables are intended to control for the expenditure needs 
of the state.  The most obvious variable to include is the per capita government 
expenditures, as more expenditure requires more revenue.  Other studies have not 
included expenditures explicitly, but rather proxies for expenditure needs (Esteller-More 
and Sole-Olle (2002) and Rork (2003)).  These are included as well as certain shares of 
                                                          
47 For examples of the lagged method, see Fredriksson, et al. (2004), Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) and 
Hayashi and Boadway (2001). 
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the population are thought to favor or require more government services.  For this 
purpose, percent of the population between age 5 and 17, percent of the population over 
the age of 65 and the total population are included, all of which may lead to more 
expenditures so a larger tax burden might be expected.  The greater the share of the 
population with a college degree may also affect government spending if a college degree 
translates to more income.  The unemployment rate has been shown in past studies to 
influence tax rates, as higher unemployment rates might encourage government to alter 
its fiscal structure to encourage job growth. 
The final set of explanatory variables included is intended to control for the 
political environment of the jurisdiction (Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2002) and Rork 
(2003)).  Two dummy variables that measure whether the state’s legislature and governor 
are the same party are included.  A dummy is included for whether both the lower house 
and the governor of the state are Democratic or whether both the lower house and the 
governor are Republican.  Both levels of government being in the same party potentially 
allows passage of bills to occur easier, thereby leading to more government spending and 
higher taxes.  Finally, year and state fixed effects are included to control for changes in 
time that are constant across states and changes in states that are constant across time, 
respectively. 
Migration Literature.  While the primary interest of this research is to understand 
the effect that net migration has on state tax burdens, the simultaneity and resulting 
econometric procedure require an understanding of how migration is determined.  
Researchers and policymakers have long been concerned with the movement of 
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individuals between jurisdictions.  It is this literature that helps guide the analysis here.48  
The literature has generally classified determinants of migration into three categories – 
personal, place and fiscal characteristics.  Models generally assume that individuals 
compare utilities in all potential locations and choose the location that maximizes their 
utility. 
As summarized in Cebula (1979) and more recently in Charney (1993), many 
fiscal characteristics are likely to affect the utility, thus affecting both in and out 
migration of individuals.  Governments are able to influence individuals’ utilities through 
tax and expenditure policies that may change income and the subsequent consumption of 
individuals.  The fiscal variables of particular interest for this study are the state tax 
measures (overall burden and personal income tax rate) chosen and the neighbors’ state 
tax measures.  As seen in the model, the choice of location for individuals is a function of 
the tax rate of their own jurisdiction as well as other potential jurisdictions. 
While the literature on the effects of tax policy on migration continues to grow, 
the results thus far are mixed.  Reasons provided for the lack of significance of taxes in 
migration decisions may be the capitalization of taxes into wages or the presence of other 
amenities that compensate individuals for the higher tax burdens.  Given the evidence 
that capitalization of income taxes exists in higher wages (Wallace (1993 and 2002) and 
Feldstein and Wrobel (1998)), the lack of significance of taxes should not be surprising. 
In addition to potential capitalization, aggregate data studies are not able to 
capture the possibility that some individuals are attracted to higher tax burdens if the 
ensuing government spending is beneficial to them while others are repelled by the 
                                                          
48 See Greenwood (1985 and 1997) for surveys on migration and its determinants. 
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higher tax burden as described in the subnational redistribution literature (Hindriks (1999 
and 2001), Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) and Wildasin (1994 and 1991)).  This 
asymmetry in responses to taxes may be reason for the lack of consistent findings in the 
aggregate data literature. 
Several of the more recent aggregate studies have made an effort to examine the 
movement of a subset of the population, which eliminates the potential asymmetry 
among migrants.  A body of literature has emerged with the intent to understand how 
fiscal policies such as estate, inheritance and gift taxes affect elderly migration with few 
results (Conway and Houtenville (1998), Gale and Heath (2000) and Conway and Rork 
(2006)).  Another body of literature investigates whether welfare individuals are attracted 
to favorable fiscal policies of a state, also with many mixed results.49  Gelbach (2004) 
offers an example of a recent study and finds that welfare recipients are less likely to 
leave high benefit states. 
Even with the lack of empirical findings, the theoretical models of utility 
maximization suggest that individuals will consider the tax and expenditure bundle of a 
state before moving, so tax measures as well as per capita government expenditures and 
per capital federal transfers of the state are included.  It is expected that higher 
government expenditures and transfers will lead to greater net migration rates, ceteris 
paribus. 
Personal characteristics are also an important component of the individual’s 
migration decision.  One of the most generally accepted findings in the migration 
literature is that age and education are both important factors in migration decisions.  It is 
                                                          
49 See Moffitt (1992) for a review of the welfare migration literature. 
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generally found that propensity for migrating reaches a peak in the early ages and then 
falls steadily as age increases until migration propensities increase again as individuals 
reach retirement age (Plane (1993) and Greenwood (1997)).  Another general finding is 
that the propensity to migrate increases as education levels increase (Greenwood (1997)).  
Because of these findings the percent of population between the ages of 5 and 17, the 
percent of the population over the age of 65 and percent of the population with a college 
degree are included.  The poverty status of an individual is also commonly found to be an 
important determinant of migration patterns with poverty thought to lessen the ability of 
the individual to move (Cushing (1993)), so the poverty rate of the state is included. 
The final category of determinants of migration is place characteristics.  Because 
the migration decision depends upon the comparison of utilities between jurisdictions, 
individuals are thought to calculate expected incomes in potential destinations.  Factors 
that influence the expected income include measures of labor market opportunities, such 
as the unemployment rate and per capita personal income (Cebula (2004) and Cushing 
and Poot (2004)).  It is generally thought that an area with more opportunities for an 
individual to be employed will be more attractive for an individual to live in. 
Another important component of place characteristics include amenities and cost-
of-living of a location.  Amenities are intended to measure the quality of life in a 
jurisdiction and may include distance to beach, the number of sunny days or some 
measure of cultural activities.  Data on these variables are limited and many do not vary 
over time.  As a result, these are not specifically included but are instead captured with a 
state-specific variable used in the panel specification.  One measure of quality of life that 
does vary over time and is available is the amount of crime in an area.  It is hypothesized 
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that crime, measured as an index of the number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, will be 
a deterrent to in-migration and encourage out-migration.  Interestingly, the empirical 
literature has found crime to be positively associated with the in-migration of elderly 
individuals (Conway and Houtenville (1998) and Duncombe, et al. (2001)).  Energy 
prices are included as a measure for the cost-of-living with the expectation that a more 
expensive state will attract fewer non-residents and repel more residents, ceteris paribus. 
As discussed above, exclusion restrictions are required to estimate the system of 
simultaneous equations.  From the discussion of explanatory variables, several control 
variables that meet the requirements emerge.  Variables that are theoretically correlated 
with tax measures but have no independent effect on migration rates include the per 
capita debt, population and the set of political dummy variables.  Variables that are 
theoretically correlated with migration rates but have no independent effect on tax 
burdens include the crime index, poverty rates and energy prices. 
See Tables 2.1 and 2.2 (all tables and figures included in appendix) for 
descriptions and sources of the data as well as summary statistics.  Figure 2.1 displays the 
trend of net migration rates and the two state tax rates described above from 1993-2004.  
As can be seen, both the state personal income tax rate and the net migration rate have 
remained relatively stable over the time period with the state tax burden decreasing 
slightly.  Figure 2.2 divides the states into columns according to whether the states had 
positive or negative net in-migration rates in 2004.  The average state tax burdens of the 
negative and positive net migration states in 2004 were 6.30 and 6.46, respectively.  Even 
though higher net migration states had higher state tax burdens as hypothesized, there is 
no statistically significant difference between the two averages.  The average personal 
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income tax rate in 2004 of the highest net in-migration states is lower than that in the 
lowest net migration states (1.71 versus 2.33 percent). 
2.E Results 
 The theoretical model presented in section 2.C indicates that the taxes of a state 
are the function of how attractive the state is as well as the taxes of the neighboring 
states.  In addition, the theory reveals that the magnitude of the neighbors’ taxes depends 
upon the monopoly power of the state resulting from its ability to maintain and attract 
individuals.  In other words, the extent of tax competition pressures on a state depends on 
the effective mobility of its tax base.  To empirically test the relationships, several 
different regressions are estimated.  The baseline results include the simultaneous 
estimations of the two tax measures and the net migration rate of the state without the 
interaction term, and are presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.50
Before discussing specific result, some general findings emerge.  First, as 
presented in Table 2.3 the overall state tax burdens are never correlated with the tax 
burdens of neighboring states.  Specifically, the coefficient estimate on the neighbor’s 
overall tax burden does not have a significant relationship with a state’s own tax burden 
indicating that states do not behave strategically when setting overall tax burdens.  
Similar to Rork (2003) but contradictory to Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2002), the 
neighbor’s personal income tax rate has a negative and significant relationship with a 
                                                          
50 Appendix Tables 2.1 and 2.2 include estimates of the two literatures described above: the empirical 
strategic interaction literature and the capital mobility literature, respectively.  Specifically, results in 
Appendix Table 2.1 mimic the majority of the tax competition literature by regressing a state’s tax burden 
and personal income tax rates on the average of the neighbors’ tax burdens and personal income tax rates 
(as described above), respectively.  Results conform to those in the previous empirical studies literature.  
Appendix Table 2.2 presents results that are intended to parallel the empirical literature that examines how 
the reduction in capital flow restrictions affects capital tax rates.  Again, any results conform to that in the 
previous empirical literature. 
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state’s own personal income tax rate indicating that states behave as strategic substitutes 
when setting personal income tax rates (Table 2.4).  Second, the attachment of the 
population to the state generally has a positive and significant relationship with a state’s 
tax measure even with the inclusion of the neighbor’s rate in the model. 
State Tax Burden 
As mentioned above, the sign on the neighbor’s state tax burden personal income 
tax rate coefficient estimate is not significant in any specification that includes the net 
migration rate of the state.51  Also of interest to this research is the effect of the net 
migration rate on the overall state tax burden.  As examined by Slemrod (2004), 
Bretschger and Hettich (2002) and Rodrik (1997), decreasing the restrictions on capital 
movement forces to governments to set lower tax rates on capital to attract the capital to 
the jurisdiction.  Analogously, a state that is able to easily attract and maintain residents 
does not face the pressures to decrease the tax to attract and maintain residents.  As 
predicted, attractive states are able to maintain higher state tax burdens in two of the three 
weight specifications when allowing for strategic interaction. 
The remaining control variables reveal several consistent determinants of a state 
tax burden.  States with higher per capita government expenditures are found to have 
higher overall tax burdens.  States with a Democratic majority in the lower house and a 
Democratic governor tend to have lower overall state tax burdens while a state with a 
Republican majority in the lower house and a Republican governor tend to have higher 
overall state tax burdens. 
                                                          
51 It should be noted that the sign on the neighbor’s state tax burden personal income tax rate coefficient 
estimate is positive and significant in two of the three specifications in Appendix Table 2.1, which excludes 
the net migration of the state from the estimation. 
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Personal Income Tax Rate 
As mentioned above and seen in Table 2.4, the sign on the neighbor’s personal 
income tax rate coefficient estimate is negative and significant in one of the neighbor 
specifications, consistent with Rork (2003) and similar to Chernick (2005) who finds that 
a neighbor’s progressivity is negatively correlated with a state’s own progressivity.  A 
one percentage point increase in the average of a state’s neighbors’ personal income tax 
rates is associated with a decrease of nearly 0.10 percentage points.52
It is also noted that the coefficient estimate of the net migration rate term is 
positive and significant in all models that allow for strategic interaction.  Similarly to the 
state tax burden specifications, a state that is able to easily attract and maintain residents 
does not face the pressures to decrease the tax to attract and maintain residents, thus the 
positive and significant coefficient estimate on the net migration rate in all three weight 
specifications. 
Results of the control variables are generally as expected with exception to the 
dummy variable for whether the lower house of state government is majority Republican 
and the governor is Republican.  The coefficient estimate is positive and significant in the 
personal income tax rate equation, which is contrary to the general finding that 
Democratic led states have higher personal income tax rates or a more progressive tax 
system (Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2002) and Chernick (2005)). 
 
 
                                                          
52 Even with the prevalence of a negative sign on the strategic interaction term in the empirical literature 
and the theoretically ambiguous, the empirical literature is not settled on the reason for the negative sign.  
Chernick (2005) offers the possibility of tax havens as reasons for the negative spatial correlation. 
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Net Migration Rate 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 include the regression results of net in-migration rate equation 
from the simultaneous procedure.  The state tax burden of a state and that of its neighbors 
does not have a significant impact on net migration rates in any of the weight 
specifications.  The state’s personal income tax rate has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on net in-migration in the simple contiguity weight specification only.  
Interestingly, the neighbors’ personal income tax rate also has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the own state’s net migration rate in two of the weight specifications.  
The lack of consistent findings in these models is not unusual given the discussion above 
regarding the potential for capitalization. 
As discussed above, the attractiveness of the state may affect the strategic 
interaction.  This is explored by examining the model with the interaction term (Table 
2.5).53  To properly examine how the attractiveness of the state may affect the strategic 
interaction, the coefficient estimates of the neighbor’s tax rate are studies.  In the 










To properly investigate the reaction function, certain values of the net migration rate must 
be used.  A common approach involves beginning with the mean of the net migration 
rate, 0.1837.  Plugging this mean into the above equation then indicates that the average 
net migration state reduces its personal income tax rate by nearly 0.08 percentage points 
                                                          
53 Net migration equations are omitted in the simultaneous equations with the interaction term for brevity.  
Results largely remain similar to those in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. 
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due to an increase of one percentage point in the average state’s neighbors’ rates, as 
displayed in Table 2.6. 
 To then investigate how a more attached population affects a state’s strategic 
interaction, consider a net migration rate that is one standard deviation above the mean, 
roughly 0.88.  This reveals that a more attractive state (or one with more monopoly 
power) will respond to an increase in its neighbors’ rates by increasing its rate by 0.08 
percentage points in response to an increase in the average of its neighbors’ personal 
income tax rates.  This key result suggests that the attractiveness of the state has 
substantial effects on strategic interaction.  A state with more monopoly power from its 
ability to attract and maintain individuals responds differently than a state that does not 
possess the monopoly power, indicating states face different risks for the feared race to 
the bottom. 
2.F Conclusion 
While much of the theoretical literature has recognized the importance of mobility 
on tax rates, the empirical literature has generally either tested for strategic interactions 
between states in setting tax rates or investigated whether capital tax rates are affected by 
the relaxation of capital controls.  Results generally indicate that states do not set tax rates 
in isolation and decreased capital controls are associated with lower capital tax rates.  
This research set out to inform both bodies of literature. 
Controlling for the simultaneous nature of the migration response and the tax rate 
decision, a positive relationship is found between the net in-migration of a state and the 
state personal income tax rate and the total state tax burden, indicating that a more 
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attractive state is able to impose higher tax rates on its residents.  In addition, there is 
evidence that the attractiveness of the state affects the strategic behavior of the state.  A 
more attractive state responds differently to a change in its neighbors’ personal income 
tax rates than a state that is not attractive. 
State policymakers have long been concerned with the potential for their state’s 
tax policy to drive away residents and prevent non-residents from locating in the state.  If 
individuals are responsive to the personal income tax rates, it seems the policymakers 
have reason to be concerned given the free interstate mobility that exists in the U.S. and 
most other developed countries.  This free mobility is thought to force state policymakers 
to reduce rates with the intention of attracting and maintaining residents.  In response, 
other states will follow by keeping their tax rates low in order to remain competitive. 
While individuals do have the ability to move freely between states, these 
movements are not necessarily costless.  Non-pecuniary costs, such as psychological 
costs of leaving friends and family, are incurred as well as pecuniary costs.  Recent 
studies have investigated the role that these non-pecuniary costs have on subnational tax 
policies.  It is hypothesized in this study that a state that easily maintains and attracts 
residents is thought to have some monopoly power that would allow the state to not be as 
concerned about the race to the bottom in tax rates.  The relative high cost of leaving the 
attractive state coupled with the relative low cost to enter the attractive state provides the 
attractive state with the ability to not feel the same pressure to lower tax rates to attract 
and maintain individuals.  In addition, the state with monopoly power will not feel the 
same competitive pressures in setting tax rates, as it does not face the same concerns with 
the race to the bottom. 
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While concerns of the race to the bottom are not unfounded, there are most likely 
attractions that factors have for certain jurisdictions that are outside the realm of public 
policy.  These attractions serve to lessen the mobility of the factors, thus changing the 
race to the bottom pressures faced by states.  Attractive states are able to maintain a 
higher tax rates on individuals than unattractive states are, but an unattractive may 
compete more aggressively for individuals.  A tax rate gap that is sufficiently large will 
result in individuals moving; therefore the attractive state will have to decrease its rate as 
well.  Results in this research indicate that attractive states are able to maintain higher 
rates than unattractive states but both rates may face increased downward pressures as the 
unattractive state increases its competition for individuals. 
90 
Essay 2: References 
Brennan, Goeffrey and James Buchanan.  1980.  The Power to Tax: Analytical 
Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bretschger, Lucas and Frank Hettich.  2002.  “Globalization, Capital Mobility and Tax 
Competition: Theory and Evidence for OECD Countries.”  European Journal of 
Political Economy 18: 695-716. 
 
Brueckner, Jan K.  2003.  “Strategic Interaction Among Governments: An Overview of 
Empirical Studies.”  International Regional Science Review 26: 175-188. 
 
Case, Anne C, Harvey S Rosen, and James R Hines, Jr.  1993  “Budget Spillovers and 
Fiscal Policy Interdependence.”  Journal of Public Economics 52: 285-307. 
 
Cebula, Richard J.  1979.  “Survey of the Literature on the Migration-Impact of State and 
Local Government Policies.”  Public Finance 34: 69-83. 
 
Charney, Alberta H.  1993.  “Migration and the Public Sector: A Survey.”  Regional 
Studies 27: 313-326. 
 
Chernick, Howard.  2005.  “On the Determinants of Subnational Tax Progressivity in the 
U.S.”  National Tax Journal 57: 93-112. 
 
Conway, Karen and Andrew Houtenville.  1998.  “Do the Elderly ‘Vote with Their 
Feet?’”  Public Choice 97: 663-685. 
 
Conway, Karen and Jonathan Rork.  2006.  “State ‘Death’ Taxes and Elderly Migration – 
The Chicken or the Egg?”  National Tax Journal 59: 97-128. 
 
Cushing, Brian.  1993.  “The Effect of the Social Welfare System on Metropolitan 
Migration by Income Group, Gender and Family Structure.”  Urban Studies 30: 
325-337. 
 
Cushing, Brian and Jacques Poot.  2004.  “Cross Boundaries and Borders: Regional 
Science Advances in Migration Modeling.”  Papers in Regional Science 83: 317-
338. 
 
Duncombe, William, Mark Robbins and Douglas A. Wolf.  2001.  “Retire to Where?  A 
Discrete Choice Model of Residential Location.”  International Journal of 
Population Geography 7: 281-293. 
 
Esteller-More, Alejandro and Albert Sole-Olle.  2002.  “Tax Setting in a Federal Setting: 
The Case of Personal Income Taxation in Canada.”  International Tax and Public 
Finance 9: 235-257. 
91 
 
Feldstein, Martin and Marian Vaillant Wrobel.  1998.  “Can State Taxes Redistribute 
Income?”  Journal of Public Economics 68: 369-396. 
 
Fischel, William A.  1975.  “Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of 
Firms in Suburban Communities.” in Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls 
(Edwin S. Mills and Wallace E. Oates, eds.) Lexington, Mass.: Heath-Lexington. 
 
Fletcher, Jason and Matthew N. Murray.  2006.  “Competition Over the Tax Base in the 
State Sales Tax.”  Public Finance Review (Forthcoming). 
 
Fredriksson, Per G., John A. List and Daniel L. Millimet.  2004.  “Chasing the 
Smokestack: Strategic Policymaking with Multiple Instruments.”  Regional 
Science and Urban Economics 34: 387-410. 
 
Fredriksson, Per G. and Daniel L. Millimet.  2002.  “Strategic Interaction and the 
Determination of Environmental Policy across U.S. States.”  Journal of Urban 
Economics 51: 101-122. 
 
Gale, Lewis R. and Will Carrington Heath.  2000.  “Elderly Internal Migration in the 
United States Revisited.”  Public Finance Review 28: 153-170. 
 
Gelbach, Jonah B.  2004.  “Migration, Life Cycle, and State Benefits: How Low is the 
Bottom?”  Journal of Political Economy 112: 1091-1130. 
 
Goodspeed, Timothy J.  2000.  “Tax Structure in a Federation.”  Journal of Public 
Economics 75: 493-506. 
 
Greenwood, Michael J.  1985.  “Human Migration: Theory, Models and Empirical 
Studies.”  Journal of Regional Science 25: 521-544. 
 
Greenwood, Michael J.  1997.  “Internal Migration in Developed Countries.”  Handbook 
of Population and Family Economics 1B: 647-720. 
 
Hayashi, Masayoshi and Robin Boadway.  2001.  “An Empirical Analysis of 
Intergovernmental Tax Interaction: The Case of Business Income Taxes in 
Canada.”  Canadian Journal of Economics 34: 481-503. 
 
Hindriks, Jean.  1999.  “The Consequences of Labour Mobility for Redistribution: Tax 
vs. Transfer Competition.”  Journal of Public Economics 74: 215-234. 
 
Hindriks, Jean.  2001.  “Mobility and Redistributive Politics.”  Journal of Public 
Economic Theory 3: 95-120. 
 
92 
Kanbur, Ravi and Michael Keen.  1993.  “Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and 
Tax   Coordination When Countries Differ in Size.”  American Economic Review 
83: 877-892. 
 
Kelejian, Harry and Ingmar Prucha.  1998.  “A Generalized Spatial Two-Stage Least 
Squares Procedure for Estimating a Spatial Autoregressive Model with 
Autoregressive Disturbances.”  Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 
17: 99-121. 
 
Maddala, G.S.  1983.  Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mansoorian, Arman and Gordon M. Myers.  1993.  “Attachment to Home and Efficient 
Purchases of Population in a Fiscal Externality Economy.”  Journal of Public 
Economics 52: 117-132. 
 
McKinnish, Terra.  2005.  “Importing the Poor: Welfare Magnetism and Cross-Border 
Welfare Migration.”  Journal of Human Resources 40: 57-76. 
 
Moffitt, Robert.  1992.  “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review.”  
Journal of Economic Literature 31: 1-61. 
 
Nelson, Forrest and Lawrence Olson.  1978.  “Specification and Estimation of a 
Simultaneous-Equation Model with Limited Dependent Variables.”  International 
Economic Review 19: 695–709. 
 
Plane, David A.  1993.  “Demographic Influences on Migration.”  Regional Studies 27: 
375-383. 
 
Razin, Assaf, Efraim Sadka and Phillip Swagel.  2002.  “Tax Burden and Migration: A 
Political Economy Theory and Evidence.”  Journal of Public Economics 85: 167-
190. 
 
Rork, Jonathan C.  2003.  “Coveting Thy Neighbors’ Taxation.”  National Tax Journal 
56: 775-87. 
 
Slemrod, Joel.  2004.  “Are Corporate Tax Rates, or Countries, Converging?”  Journal of 
Public Economics 88: 1169-1186. 
 
Tiebout, Charles.  .  “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.”  Journal of Political 
Economy 64: 416-424. 
 
Wallace, Sally.  2002.  “The Effect of State Income Tax Structure on Interstate 
Migration.”  Georgia State University, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, 
FRP Report No. 79. 
93 
 
Wallace, Sally.  1993.  “The Effects of State Personal Income Tax Differentials on 
Wages.”  Regional Science and Urban Economics 23: 611-628. 
 
Wellisch, Dietmar.  1994.  “Interregional Spillovers in the Presence of Perfect and 
Imperfect Household Mobility.”  Journal of Public Economics 55: 167-184.Keen, 
Michael and Maurice Marchand.  1997.  “Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of 
Public Spending.”  Journal of Public Economics 66: 33-53. 
 
Wildasin, David E.  1994.  “Income Redistribution and Migration.”  Canadian Journal of 
Economics 27: 637-656. 
 
Wildasin, David E.  1991.  “Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market.”  
American Economic Review 81: 757-774. 
 
Wilson, John.  1999.  “Theories of Tax Competition.”  National Tax Journal 52: 269-
304. 
 
Wilson, John and David Wildasin.  2004.  “Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon?”  



















































































Net Loss in Migration Rates Net Gain in Migration Rates
New York -1.117 Nevada 2.902
Massachusetts -0.918 Arizona 1.489
Illinois -0.561 Florida 1.470
New Jersey -0.521 Idaho 0.923
Kansas -0.436 Delaware 0.701
California -0.407 Montana 0.677
Michigan -0.362 South Carolina 0.586
Utah -0.325 North Carolina 0.548
Connecticut -0.307 Georgia 0.513
Nebraska -0.298 Maine 0.434
Ohio -0.272 Tennessee 0.398
North Dakota -0.216 Arkansas 0.368
Louisiana -0.168 Virginia 0.349
Minnesota -0.167 New Mexico 0.315
 
Rhode Island -0.143 Wyoming 0.271
Colorado -0.139 Washington 0.259
Oklahoma -0.131 New Hampshire 0.242
Maryland -0.109 South Dakota 0.190
Iowa -0.105 Kentucky 0.187
Indiana -0.050 West Virginia 0.183







Figure 2.2: Migration Rankings by State, 2004
 
Table 2.1: Variable Description and Source Notes
Variable Name Description Source
Migration Rate ((Inmigrationt - Outmigrationt)/Populationt-1)*100 Census Bureau
State Tax Burden (Total State Tax Revenue divided by Total State Personal Income)*100 Census Bureau
State and Local Tax Burden (Total State and Local Tax Revenue divided by Census Bureau
 Total State Personal Income)*100
Neighbor's Avg State Tax Burden Average of Neighbors' State Tax Burden Author's Calculation
Neighbor's Avg State and Local Tax Burden Average of Neighbors' State and Local Tax Burden Author's Calculation
Avg PIT (Personal Income Tax Revenue divided by Total Personal Income)*100 Census Bureau
Neighbor's Avg PIT Average of Neighbors' Average PITs Author's Calculation
Sales Tax Rate General sales tax rate State Tax Handbook
Corporate Income Tax Rate Highest marginal corporate income tax rate State Tax Handbook
% Pop from age 5-17 Percent of state population between the ages of 5 and 17 Census Bureau
% Pop Over 65 Percent of state population over the age of 65 Census Bureau
Unrate State Unemployment Rate Bureau of Labor Statistics
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) State Per Capita Income scaled by 1000 Bureau of Economic Analysis
% Pop with College Degree Percent of state population with a college degree Census Bureau
Per Capita Intergovernmental Grant State per capita intergovernmental grant Census Bureau
Per Capita Govt Expenditures State per capita government expenditures Census Bureau
Same Govt Dummy (1=Republican) Dummy Variable equal to one if the lower house of state government is Author's Calculation
majority Republican and the governor is Republican
Same Govt Dummy (1=Democrat) Dummy Variable equal to one if the lower house of state government is Author's Calculation
majority Democrat and the governor is Democrat
Per Capita Debt State per capita debt Census Bureau
Population (scaled by 1000) State population scaled by 1000 Census Bureau
Crime Index Criminal offenses known to police per 100,000 population Federal Bureau of Investigation
Poverty Rate Percent of state population under the Census defined poverty rate Census Bureau





Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Name Mean Std Dev Min Max Mean Std Dev Min Max
Migration Rate 0.35 0.81 -1.26 2.63 0.14 0.64 -1.12 2.90
State Tax Burden 6.63 1.12 3.93 10.00 6.39 1.09 4.22 8.95
Neighbor's Avg State Tax Burden 6.54 0.59 3.93 7.52 6.28 0.56 4.22 7.50
State and Local Tax Burden 10.51 1.12 8.71 14.53 10.07 0.95 8.15 13.12
Neighbor's Avg State and Local Tax Burden 10.44 0.70 9.14 12.00 9.97 0.55 8.26 11.15
Avg PIT 2.00 1.05 0.00 3.88 1.98 1.01 0.00 3.88
Neighbor's Avg PIT 2.02 0.61 0.14 3.46 1.99 0.59 0.11 3.16
Sales Tax Rate 4.69 1.72 0.00 7.00 4.93 1.77 0.00 7.00
Corporate Income Tax Rate 6.75 3.04 0.00 12.00 6.61 3.00 0.00 12.00
% Pop from age 5-17 18.90 1.75 16.20 25.66 17.83 1.01 15.62 21.24
% Pop Over 65 12.86 1.77 8.84 18.48 12.65 1.53 8.69 16.83
Unrate 6.26 1.40 2.80 10.40 5.16 0.90 3.50 7.30
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) 20.30 2.85 15.29 28.98 31.89 4.62 24.38 45.51
% Pop with College Degree 21.05 4.15 12.20 30.20 26.84 4.85 15.30 36.70
Per Capita Intergovernmental Grant 760.43 192.29 458.64 1515.96 1438.82 502.75 696.61 3906.33
Per Capita Govt Expenditures 2935.20 545.28 2112.00 4113.40 4823.94 895.96 3441.53 7107.06
Same Govt Dummy (1=Republican) 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00
Same Govt Dummy (1=Democrat) 0.42 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00
Per Capita Debt 1709.81 1187.59 374.90 5132.90 2649.26 1515.21 607.66 7957.10
Population (scaled by 1000) 5321.83 5720.44 469.03 31147.21 6066.31 6577.45 505.89 35842.04
Crime Index 4925.19 1236.08 2533.00 8351.00 3794.84 981.75 1996.00 5844.60
Poverty Rate 14.34 4.19 8.50 26.40 12.12 2.92 5.40 18.60
Energy Prices 8.3279 1.3893 5.47 11.73 11.55 2.11 7.64 17.13
State and Local Tax Burden entries are listed for 2004 or for 2002 because of availability






Table 2.3: 2SLS Results
Migration Tax Rate Migration Tax Rate Migration Tax Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Migration Rate 0.7551* 0.6405 0.7670*
(0.4151) (0.4201) (0.4101)
State Tax Burden -0.0419 -0.0215 -0.0565
(0.1510) (0.1474) (0.1488)
Neighbor's Avg State Tax Burden1 0.1106 0.0875 0.0763 0.0621 -0.0404 -0.1761
(0.0674) (0.0973) (0.0582) (0.0900) (0.0762) (0.1119)
% Pop from age 5-17 0.1565*** -0.0975 0.1575*** -0.0813 0.1596*** -0.0874
(0.0275) (0.0662) (0.0275) (0.0668) (0.0284) (0.0656)
% Pop Over 65 -0.1014* 0.0874 -0.0985* 0.0766 -0.0853 0.0859
(0.0523) (0.0874) (0.0522) (0.0864) (0.0519) (0.0865)
Unrate -0.2229*** 0.1029 -0.2222*** 0.0767 -0.2277*** 0.1128
(0.0248) (0.0998) (0.0248) (0.1005) (0.0252) (0.1008)
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) 0.0805*** -0.0193 0.0807*** -0.0097 0.0822*** -0.0261
(0.0155) (0.0406) (0.0156) (0.0409) (0.0157) (0.0411)
% Pop with College Degree 0.0019 0.0090 0.0020 0.0101 0.0029 0.0114
(0.0083) (0.0122) (0.0083) (0.0119) (0.0084) (0.0122)
Per Capita Intergovernmental Grant 0.0003** 0.0002 0.0003** 0.0002 0.0003** 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Per Capita Govt Expenditures (t-1) 0.0002*** 0.0002 0.0002** 0.0002* 0.0002*** 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Same Govt Dummy (1=Republican) 0.1409* 0.1296* 0.1420**
(0.0732) (0.0726) (0.0708)
Same Govt Dummy (1=Democrat) -0.1520** -0.1396** -0.1512**
(0.0667) (0.0659) (0.0671)
Per Capita Debt -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Population (scaled by 1000) -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Crime Index 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Poverty Rate -0.0169** -0.0168** -0.0172**
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0078)
Energy Prices 0.0505*** 0.0495*** 0.0499***
(0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0157)
Constant -5.7714*** 5.7764** -5.7046*** 5.3509** -5.1451*** 7.2344***
(1.0906) (2.7147) (1.0975) (2.7127) (1.1901) (2.6683)
Observations 576 576 576 576 576 576
R-squared 0.888 0.882 0.889 0.889 0.887 0.881
1 - Neighbor's rate lagged by one period in the average state burden regression
Standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%





Table 2.4: Simultaneous Tobit Model
Migration Tax Rate Migration Tax Rate Migration Tax Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Migration Rate 0.4443*** 0.4487*** 0.4448***
(0.1606) (0.1450) (0.1424)
State Personal Income Tax -0.7324* -0.4647 -0.7059
(0.4094) (0.4138) (0.4467)
Neighbor's Avg State Personal Income Tax1 -0.1849 -0.1080** -0.2552* -0.1255*** -0.3693*** -0.0940**
(0.1552) (0.0438) (0.1402) (0.0239) (0.1001) (0.0415)
% Pop from age 5-17 0.1731*** -0.0531** 0.1715*** -0.0542** 0.1867*** -0.0510**
(0.0285) (0.0247) (0.0292) (0.0225) (0.0289) (0.0214)
% Pop Over 65 -0.1466** -0.0247 -0.1290** -0.0341 -0.1505** -0.0268
(0.0600) (0.0251) (0.0612) (0.0286) (0.0609) (0.0279)
Unrate -0.2715*** 0.0285 -0.2559*** 0.0295 -0.2658*** 0.0305
(0.0352) (0.0390) (0.0353) (0.0349) (0.0364) (0.0360)
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) 0.0735*** -0.0464*** 0.0720*** -0.0460*** 0.0696*** -0.0451***
(0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0157) (0.0143) (0.0150) (0.0132)
% Pop with College Degree -0.0030 -0.0117** -0.0024 -0.0114** -0.0029 -0.0105**
(0.0085) (0.0049) (0.0089) (0.0047) (0.0086) (0.0044)
Sales Tax Rate (t-1) -0.1664** -0.0925*** -0.1203 -0.0870*** -0.1520* -0.0981***
(0.0812) (0.0233) (0.0797) (0.0208) (0.0857) (0.0232)
Corporate Income Tax Rate (t-1) 0.0060 0.0074 -0.0002 0.0105 0.0058 0.0129
(0.0215) (0.0088) (0.0213) (0.0084) (0.0223) (0.0169)
Per Capita Intergovernmental Grant 0.0004*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0004*** 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Per Capita Govt Expenditures (t-1) 0.0002*** -0.0001** 0.0002*** -0.0001** 0.0002*** -0.0001**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Same Govt Dummy (1=Republican) 0.0944*** 0.0931*** 0.0911***
(0.0290) (0.0272) (0.0275)
Same Govt Dummy (1=Democrat) -0.0199 -0.0168 -0.0203
(0.0269) (0.0254) (0.0251)
Per Capita Debt 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Population (scaled by 1000) 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Crime Index 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Poverty Rate -0.0227*** -0.0205*** -0.0219***
(0.0080) (0.0079) (0.0080)
Energy Prices 0.0660*** 0.0611*** 0.0704***
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0181)
Constant -0.6861 5.5255*** -1.5140 5.3931*** -0.4651 5.1755***
(2.0353) (0.7061) (2.0516) (0.7149) (2.0998) (0.6039)
Observations 576 576 576 576 576 576
1 - Neighbor's rate lagged by one period in the average state burden regression
Standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%




Table 2.5: Interaction Models
Sburd PIT Sburd PIT Sburd PIT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Net Migration Rate 1.2644** 0.0552*** 1.1360** 0.2078*** 1.4522*** 0.1903***
(0.9025) (0.1761) (0.9052) (0.1724) (0.9296) (0.1710)
Neighbor's Avg State Tax Measure (t-1) 0.1290 -0.1180*** 0.0623 -0.0867*** -0.2793* -0.0793***
(0.1026) (0.0617) (0.0940) (0.0374) (0.1472) (0.0424)
Migration * Neighbor Tax Interaction -0.0749 0.2223*** -0.0635 0.1448*** -0.0874 0.1163***
(0.0762) (0.0402) (0.0759) (0.0361) (0.0792) (0.0379)
% Pop from age 5-17 -0.0111 -0.0465* -0.0125 -0.0441* 0.0146 -0.0468**
(0.0595) (0.0239) (0.0573) (0.0234) (0.0648) (0.0230)
% Pop Over 65 0.1246 -0.0076 0.1287 -0.0112 0.1519 -0.0169
(0.0980) (0.0342) (0.0953) (0.0333) (0.1025) (0.0259)
Unrate 0.1569 0.0350 0.1377 0.0374 0.1954 0.0297
(0.1353) (0.0392) (0.1348) (0.0394) (0.1398) (0.0375)
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) -0.0085 -0.0609*** -0.0040 -0.0592*** -0.0270 -0.0474***
(0.0363) (0.0151) (0.0351) (0.0154) (0.0409) (0.0146)
% Pop with College Degree 0.0034 -0.0053 0.0046 -0.0063 0.0051 -0.0091**
(0.0143) (0.0046) (0.0139) (0.0046) (0.0151) (0.0044)
Sales Tax Rate (t-1) -0.0957*** -0.1160*** -0.0820***
(0.0182) (0.0216) (0.0204)
Corporate Income Tax Rate (t-1) 0.0285*** 0.0205* 0.0088
(0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0077)
Per Capita Intergovernmental Grant 0.0004** 0.0001 0.0004** 0.0001 0.0004** 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Per Capita Govt Expenditures (t-1) 0.0001 -0.0001** 0.0001 -0.0001** 0.0001 -0.0001**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Same Govt Dummy (1=Republican) 0.1548 0.1086*** 0.1492 0.1114*** 0.1642* 0.0984***
(0.0965) (0.0286) (0.0948) (0.0286) (0.0942) (0.0274)
Same Govt Dummy (1=Democrat) -0.2125*** -0.0175 -0.2025** -0.0160 -0.2234*** -0.0121
(0.0808) (0.0266) (0.0795) (0.0264) (0.0843) (0.0257)
Per Capita Debt 0.0000 0.0001*** -0.0000 0.0001*** -0.0000 0.0000*
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Population (scaled by 1000) -0.0002* 0.0001*** -0.0002* 0.0001*** -0.0001 0.0001***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Constant 2.9724 4.9861*** 3.2456* 5.0925*** 5.0585** 5.2270***
(1.9994) (0.6985) (1.9322) (0.6904) (2.1473) (0.6689)
Observations 576 576 576 576 576 576
Standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
Signifance of Net Migration Rate and State Tax Measure coefficient estimates
  are based on joint signifance with the interaction term





Table 2.6: Interaction Interpretations
Contiguity City-Contiguity Pop-Contiguity
Effect of increasing neighbor's PIT rate by one
with mean net migration rate -0.0772 -0.0601 -0.0579
if migration rate up one standard deviation 0.0781 0.0410 0.0233





Appendix Table 2.1: Strategic Competition Models
Sburd PIT Sburd PIT Sburd PIT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighbor's Avg State Tax Measure (t-1) 0.1699** -0.0360 0.1296* -0.0946*** -0.1223 -0.0626
(0.0802) (0.0354) (0.0750) (0.0258) (0.1009) (0.0493)
% Pop from age 5-17 -0.0045 0.0021 -0.0009 -0.0019 0.0060 0.0047
(0.0392) (0.0149) (0.0392) (0.0139) (0.0396) (0.0148)
% Pop Over 65 0.0203 -0.0731*** 0.0179 -0.0697*** 0.0218 -0.0851***
(0.0738) (0.0191) (0.0740) (0.0211) (0.0740) (0.0209)
Unrate -0.0683** -0.0741*** -0.0682** -0.0741*** -0.0648** -0.0730***
(0.0310) (0.0124) (0.0311) (0.0124) (0.0315) (0.0126)
Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) 0.0424** -0.0116 0.0431** -0.0087 0.0382* -0.0114*
(0.0208) (0.0078) (0.0208) (0.0074) (0.0211) (0.0068)
% Pop with College Degree 0.0129 -0.0079* 0.0135 -0.0074* 0.0160 -0.0072
(0.0112) (0.0044) (0.0112) (0.0045) (0.0112) (0.0046)
Sales Tax Rate (t-1) -0.1286*** -0.1223*** -0.1354***
(0.0196) (0.0276) (0.0144)
Corporate Income Tax Rate (t-1) 0.0124 0.0141 0.0156
(0.0096) (0.0164) (0.0120)
Per Capita Intergovernmental Grant 0.0004** 0.0001 0.0004** 0.0001 0.0004** 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Per Capita Govt Expenditures (t-1) 0.0004*** -0.0000 0.0004*** -0.0000 0.0004*** -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Same Govt Dummy (1=Republican) 0.0547 0.0447** 0.0565 0.0429* 0.0603 0.0434*
(0.0520) (0.0225) (0.0520) (0.0233) (0.0520) (0.0229)
Same Govt Dummy (1=Democrat) -0.0720** 0.0312 -0.0723 0.0311 -0.0680 0.0308
(0.0467) (0.0205) (0.0468) (0.0204) (0.0468) (0.0205)
Per Capita Debt -0.0000 0.0001*** -0.0000 0.0001*** -0.0001 0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Population (scaled by 1000) -0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Constant 2.3873 4.1317*** 2.6122* 3.9334*** 4.1133** 4.0412***
(1.5518) (0.4929) (1.5465) (0.4992) (1.6103) (0.4998)
Observations 576 576 576 576 576 576
Standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%





Appendix Table 2.2:  Mobility Models
Sburd PIT
(1) (2)
Net Migration Rate 0.6254 0.4094***
(0.4050) (0.1473)
% Pop from age 5-17 -0.0793 -0.0492**
(0.0653) (0.0227)




Per Capita Income (scaled by 1000) -0.0090 -0.0425***
(0.0395) (0.0140)
% Pop with College Degree 0.0110 -0.0106**
(0.0119) (0.0045)
Sales Tax Rate (t-1) -0.0960***
(0.0217)
Corporate Income Tax Rate (t-1) 0.0121
(0.0110)
Per Capita Intergovernmental Grant 0.0002 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0001)
Per Capita Govt Expenditures (t-1) 0.0002* -0.0001**
(0.0001) (0.0000)
Same Govt Dummy (1=Republican) 0.1315* 0.0917***
(0.0696) (0.0275)
Same Govt Dummy (1=Democrat) -0.1360** -0.0132
(0.0656) (0.0254)
Per Capita Debt -0.0000 0.0000*
(0.0001) (0.0000)
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